This volume addresses the complex interplay between the conditions of an agent's personal autonomy and the constitution of her self in light of two influential background assumptions: a libertarian thesis according to which it is essential for personal autonomy to be able to choose freely how one's self is shaped, on the one hand, and a line of thought following especially the seminal work of Harry Frankfurt according to which personal autonomy necessarily rests on an already sufficiently shaped self, on the other hand. Given this conceptual framework, a number of influential aspects within current debate can be addressed in a new and illuminating light: accordingly, the volume's contributions range from 1) discussing fundamental conceptual interconnections between personal autonomy and freedom of the will, 2) addressing the exact role and understanding of different personal traits, e.g. Frankfurt's notion of volitional necessities, commitments to norms and ideals, emotions, the phenomenon of weakness of will, and psychocorporeal aspects, 3) and finally taking into account social influences, which are discussed in terms of their ability to buttress, to weaken, or even to serve as necessary preconditions of personal autonomy and the forming of one's self. The volume thus provides readers with an extensive and most up-to-date discussion of various influential strands of current philosophical debate on the topic. It is of equal interest to all those already engaged in the debate as well as to readers trying to get an up-to-date overview or looking for a textbook to use in courses.

Autorentext

Michael Kühler is private lecturer (Privatdozent) and Post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics at the University of Münster, Germany. His areas of specialization include ethics, metaethics, political philosophy and the philosophy of love. He has written a book on moral justification and motivation (Moral und Ethik Rechtfertigung und Motivation. Ein zweifaches Verständnis von Moralbegründung, Mentis, 2006) and has just finished a second book project on the relation between ought and can (Sollen ohne Können? Über Sinn und Geltung nicht erfüllbarer Sollensansprüche, Mentis, forthcoming). Currently, he is working on, among other things, the relation between personal autonomy and love.

Nadja Jelinek was Research Fellow at the University of Konstanz, Germany, from 2005-2009. Currently she is about to finish her doctoral thesis, dedicated to a close examination of the relation between normativity and freedom/autonomy in the works of Harry Frankfurt, Charles Taylor and authors following the theory of George Herbert Mead. Her main research interests are, apart from theories of freedom and autonomy, theories of personhood and moral philosophy, especially applied ethics.

Inhalt

Foreword.- Introduction; Michael Kühler, Nadja Jelinek.- Section I: Autonomy and Free Will.- 1. Freedom Without Choice?; Gottfried Seebaß.- 2. Freedom and Normativity Varieties of Free Will; Barbara Merker.- Section II: Autonomy, the Self, and the Role of Personal Traits.- 3. Norm-Guided Formation of Cares without Volitional Necessity A Response to Frankfurt; John Davenport.- 4. Dynamics in Autonomy; Nadja Jelinek.- 5. The Normative Significance of Personal Projects; Monika Betzler.- 6. Normative Self-Constitution and Individual Autonomy; John Christman.- 7. Psychocorporeal Selfhood, Practical Intelligence, and Adaptive Autonomy; Diana Tietjens Meyers.- 8. Emotion, Autonomy, and Weakness of Will; Sabine Döring.- 9. Who Am I to Uphold Unrealizable Normative Claims?; Michael Kühler.- Section III: Autonomy and the Self Within Society's Grip.- 10. Paternalistic Love and Reasons for Caring; Bennett W. Helm.- 11. Self-Identity and Moral Agency; Marina Oshana.- 12. Being Identical by Being (Treated as) Responsible; Michael Quante.- 13. Integrity Endangered by Hypocrisy; Nora Hangel.- 14. Who Can I Blame?; Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen.- About the Authors.- Index.