Given the shortcomings of the Paris Agreement, Anja Zenker examines the potential of free trade benefits as an incentive mechanism for an effective and stable climate change cooperation of states. She addresses the question of how the specific policy design affects the success of the agreement, market and trade outcomes, as well as the compatibility with multilateral WTO obligations. Contents

• Mitigation Incentives in the Post-2020 Climate Change Framework

• International Climate Agreements: A Survey of the Game-Theoretic Literature

• Building a Climate-Trade Coalition in a Downstream vs. Upstream System of Emission Trading

• WTO Compatibility of a Climate-Trade Agreement Target Groups

• Academics, researchers, and students in the fields of environmental and resource economics, international economics (trade and the environment), applied game theory, international policy, international environmental law, WTO law

• Experts and decision makers in the fields of energy policy, (renewable) energy industry, foreign relations, trade and development cooperation The AuthorFrom 2012 to 2019, Dr. Anja Zenker was a lecturer and research associate at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of the Chemnitz University of Technology. Since then, she has worked as a policy officer for agriculture, environment, energy and transport in the Representation of the Free State of Thuringia to the European Union.

Inhalt
Mitigation Incentives in the Post2020 Climate Change Framework.- International Climate Agreements: A Survey of the GameTheoretic Literature.- Building a ClimateTrade Coalition in a Downstream vs. Upstream System of Emission Trading.- WTO Compatibility of a ClimateTrade Agreement.