The question of the legal effect of the recognition of states has been characterized by the debate between the constitutive and the declaratory schools of thought for over a century. An examination of the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus however shows that neither of the two theories can satisfactorily explain the collective non-recognition of an entity that meets the criteria for statehood but that has been created in violation of a fundamental rule of public international law.

The question of the legal effect of the recognition of new entities that call themselves 'states' has been characterized for over a century by the intense debate between the constitutive and the declaratory schools of thought. An examination of the American, British and German state practice in the case of the internationally non-recognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus however shows that none of the two theories can satisfactorily explain the non-recognition as a state of an entity that meets all the international legal criteria for statehood but that has been created in violation of a fundamental norm of international law. Non-recognition of an existing state can neither have status-preventing nor status-confirming effect, it can only have status-denying, i.e. negatory, effect. Collective non-recognition has been employed by the international community since the 1930s as a sanction against serious breaches of fundamental norms of international law affecting the international community as a whole. Initially coordinated by the League of Nations it is now administered by the United Nations. Non-recognition as a state means that other states do not just withhold all optional or discretionary relations and the resulting rights and privileges from an 'illegal state' but that they deny it all the rights, powers and privileges inherent in statehood.

Autorentext
Geboren 1965; Studium der Rechtswissenschaft in Tübingen, München und Cambridge (LL.M., 1989); von 1991 bis 1995 Promotion an der Universität Oxford; 1995 Doctor of Philosophy (D.Phil.); 2002 Habilitation; 2003 Master of Arts (M.A.); 2003-11 University Lecturer, Reader ab 2008 Professor of Public International Law an der Universität Oxford. Seit 2011 Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Öffentliches Recht, Völkerrecht und Europarecht an der Universität Bonn.