The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved. Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This second volume examines constitutional political economy and also various applications, including public policy, international relations, and the study of history, as well as methodological and measurement issues. Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.
Auteur
Roger D. Congleton is the BB&T Professor of Economics at West Virginia University. He is coeditor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy , and has publishing well over a hundred fifty articles on public choice related topics in journals and academic books. Professor Congleton also served as president of the Public Choice Society from March 2018 through March 2020. Bernard Grofman is the Jack W. Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine. Stefan Voigt is professor of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg in Germany. He is best known for his research in constitutional political economy. Together with Roger Congleton, he is editor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy.
Contenu
PART V: Constitutional Political Economy A. On the Architecture of Governance 1. How Should Votes be Cast and Counted? Nicolaus Tideman 2. Voters and representatives: How should representatives be selected? Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer 3. Divided Government: the king and the council George Tridimas 4. Bicameralism Cecilia Testa 5. Federalism Jaroslaw Kantorowicz 6. Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design Nicholas R. Miller 7. Politics and the Legal System Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal 8. Constitutional Review Nuno Garoupa 9. Institutions for Amending Constitutions Cristina Bucur and Bjørn Erik Rasch 10. Constitutional Transition Zachary Elkins 11. Electoral systems in the making Daniel Bochsler 12. Choosing Voting Rules in the European Union B?la Plechanovová, Madeleine O. Hosli and Anatolij Plechanov B. The Theory of Dictatorship 13. Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods Martin C. McGuire 14. Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model after 40 Years Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt 15. Are There Types of Dictatorship? Ronald Wintrobe 16. Are there really dictatorships? The Selectorate and authoritarian governance Alejandro Quiroz Flores 17. The coup: competition for office in authoritarian regimes Toke Aidt and Gabriel Leon 18. The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice Perspectives Timur Kuran and Diego Romero C. On the Effects of the Institutions of Governance 19. Direct Democracy and Public Policy John G. Matsusaka 20. Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems Sebastian M. Saiegh 21. The Significance of Political Parties Michael Munger 22. The least dangerous branch? Public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance Georg Vanberg 23. Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy Stefan Voigt and Jerg Gutmann PART VI: APPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES A. The Politics of Public Policy 24. The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution Stanley L. Winer 25. The politics of central bank independence Jakob de Haan and Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger 26. The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy Luna Bellani and Heinrich Ursprung 27. Political Participation and the welfare Rainald Borck 28. Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design Paul Dragos Aligica and Michael E. Cox 29. Rational Ignorance and Public Choice Ilya Somin 30. Is Government Growth Inevitable? Randall G. Holcombe B. International Public Choice 31. The Political Economy of International Organizations Axel Dreher and Valentin F. Lang 32. The Politics of International Trade Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman 33. Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets and the Shadow Economy: What do we (not) know? Friedrich Schneider 34. The Politics of International Aid Hristos Doucouliagos 35. Is democracy exportable? Pierre Salmon C. Public Choice and History 36. Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy Robert K. Fleck and F. Andrew Hanssen 37. Christian History and Public Choice Mario Ferrero 38. Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention Keith L. Dougherty 39. Precursors to public choice Iain McLean D. Measurement and other Methodological Issues 40. Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole 41. The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting Keith T. Poole 42. Voting and Popularity Gebhard Kirchgässner 43. Detection of election fraud Susumu Shikano and Verena Mack 44. Experimental Public Choice: Elections Aaron Kamm and Arthur Schram 45. Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting Jean-Robert Tyran and Alexander K. Wagner