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The definitive introduction to game theory
This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives.
Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them.
Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory
Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information
Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises
Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission
Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students
Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
Auteur
Steven Tadelis
Résumé
The definitive introduction to game theoryThis comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives.Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them.Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theoryCovers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete informationFeatures a variety of examples, applications, and exercisesTopics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmissionIdeal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate studentsComplete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
Contenu
Preface xi
PART I Rational Decision Making
Chapter 1 The Single-Person Decision Problem 3
1.4 Exercises 11
Chapter 2 Introducing Uncertainty and Time 14
PART II Static Games of Complete Information
Chapter 3 Preliminaries 43
3.5 Exercises 58
Chapter 4 Rationality and Common Knowledge 59
Chapter 5 Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium 79
Chapter 6 Mixed Strategies 101
6.6 Exercises 123
PART III Dynamic Games of Complete Information
Chapter 7 Preliminaries 129
7.5 Exercises 147
Chapter 8 Credibility and Sequential Rationality 151
8.1 Sequentia…