Monetary Theory and Policy

Didier LAUSSEL, William MAROIS and Antoine SOUBEYRAN The papers collected in this volume were presented at the "4th International Conference on Monetary Economics and Banking" held in Aix-en-Provence on June 1987 and organized by the C.E.F.I. (Center for International Economics and Finance of the University of Aix-Marseille II) and the GRECO "Monnaie et Financement" of the C.N.R.S. (National Center for Scientific Research). They concern two main topics: monetary theory and monetary policy. In the first one, the contributions provide new insights in some important problems like rational expectations, monetary optimizing models or portfolio choices. In the second one, almost all the texts are devoted to the game-theoretic approach of monetary policy which is a research area mainly developped since about ten years. I. MONETARY THEORY In their well known article on "Recent Developments in Monetary Theory", R. BARRO and S. FISCHER (1976) discussed seven main topics among which "the theory of money demand", "money, inflation and growth", "disequilibrium theory", "rational expectations and the Phillips Curve". Twelve years after, papers of this volume give some new results in these areas or explore new paths of research like a monetary theory of an innovative process of production or the application of the theory of contracts to financial problems.

Contenu

I - Monetary Theory.- . Speculative Markets and Macroeconomic Controversy.- . A Neo-Structuralist Model of Inflation and Unemployment.- . Towards a Monetary Theory of a Process of Change.- . Ruling out Multiple Equilibrium Paths in Monetary Optimizing Models: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.- . The Optimal Sharing Money-Bond in the Portfolio: the Random Characteristics Approach.- . Debt Contract under Imperfect Information: a Survey.- Causal Relations Among the Sources of Money Supply: the Portuguese Case.- II - Monetary Policy Games.- . Monetary Policy Credibility and Coordination.- . A Folk Theorem of Monetary Policy.- . On the Convergence of Beliefs and Policy to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium in a Dual Policy Problem.- . Public Debt, Inflation and the Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policies.- . Decentralized Monetary Rules in a Three-Country Model and Time Series Evidence of Structural Dependence.- . Fiscal Expectations and Current Account Surplus of the Main OECD Countries.- . The Political Economy of Debt Repudiation and Expropriation in LDCs.