Neuropsychology of the Sense of Agency

The complex issues of agency and self-agency have been examined by researchers in the related fields of psychology and neuropsychology. This volume approaches the cognitive and neuropsychological correlates as two sides of the same coin, with the aim of establishing a correspondence between the hardware (cerebral processes) and software (cognitive processes) of the representation of agency. All living systems self-regulate, and within any living system - whether it is as small as a cell or a complete plant or animal - there must be communication between its many parts. In addition, a prerequisite for organisms to act is an ability to distinguish between self and other. In humans, this ability may be either learned or comprise an inherent part of the process of action. The predominant account explaining the sense of agency of our own actions is the "central monitoring theory" or "comparator model" which postulates the monitoring of central and peripheral signals arising as a consequence of the execution of an action. Alternative perspectives include simulation theory. These models, as well as the contribution of body representation for agency, are explored here, taking into account the significance of proprioceptive feedback for self-agent attribution. Finally, the neural correlates of action and agent representation are discussed in the context of recent empirical results.

Résumé
Not nothing without you but not the same Erich Fried (1979) How do I know that I am the person who is moving? The neuroscience of action has identified specific cognitive processes that allow the organism to refer the cause or origin of an action to its agent. This sense of agency has been defined as the sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action or a certain thought in my stream of consciousness. As such, one can distinguish actions that are self-generated from those generated by others, giving rise to the experience of a self-other disti- tion in the domain of action. A tentative list of the features distinguishing the concept of agency includes awareness of a goal, of an intention to act, and of initiation of action; awareness of movements; a sense of activity, of mental effort, and of control; and the concept of authorship. However, it remains unclear how these various aspects of action and agency are related, to what extent they are dissociable, and whether some are more basic than others. Their sources remain to be specified and their relationship to action specification and action control mechanism is as yet unknown.

Contenu
Section I Cognition, Consciousness and Agency.- 1 The Sense of Agency in Psychology and Neuropsychology.- 2 Affordances and the Sense of Joint Agency.- Section II Brain, Agency and Self-agency: Neuropsychological Contributions to the Development of the Sense of Agency.- 3 The Neuropsychology of Senses of Agency: Theoretical and Empirical Contributions.- 4 Functional Anatomy of the Sense of Agency: Past Evidence and Future Directions.- 5 The Monitoring of Experience and Agency in Daily Life: A Study with Italian Adolescents.- 6 Agency and Inter-agency, Action and Joint Action: Theoretical and Neuropsychological Evidence.- Section III Clinical Aspects Associated with Disruption of the Sense of Agency.- 7 Disruption of the Sense of Agency: From Perception to Self-knowledge.- 8 Disturbances of the Sense of Agency in Schizophrenia.- 9 Looking for Outcomes: The Experience of Control and Sense of Agency in Obsessive-compulsive Behaviors.- 10 Body and Self-awareness: Functional and Dysfunctional Mechanisms.- Subject Index.