Economic Growth and Endogenous Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Reform China

This book analyzes the dynamic political economy of authoritarian institutions in China and attempts to answer the following questions: What is the significance of China's authoritarian institutions and the changes Xi Jinping has brought to them? Why did the Chinese elites go along with the changes that affected them negatively? Through these questions, the author unravels the mechanics of authoritarian resilience as well as its dynamics. The work reviews both literatures on China studies and comparative authoritarianism to introduce a general framework for analyzing authoritarian institutional change under dictatorships. Hans H. Tung is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Research Associate of the Center for Research in Econometric Theory and Applications at National Taiwan University, Taiwan.

Auteur
Hans H. Tung is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Research Associate of the Center for Research in Econometric Theory and Applications at National Taiwan University, Taiwan.

Contenu
1. Chapter 1 Introduction
Part I A Theory of Authoritarian Institutional Change

2. Chapter 2 Why? A Dynamic Theory of Power and Plenty Under Dictatorships
3. Chapter 3 How? The Dictator's Divide-and-Rule Strategy
   Part II The Era of Institutionalized Authoritarian Rule and Dictator's Growth Curse: A Case Study on China's Trade Policymaking
4. Chapter 4 Authoritarian Institutions, China Style
5. Chapter 5 Dictator's Growth Curse and China's Trade Politics
6. Chapter 6 Still an Era of Fragmented Authoritarian 1.0? A Probabilistic Crucial Case Analysis
7. Chapter 7 Authoritarian Power-Sharing Under Collective Leadership and China's Trade Policy-Making
   Part III Dynamics-The Era of Institutional Flux
8. Chapter 8 Theoretical Extensions: Unbundling Authoritarian Institutions and Their Changes Under Xi Jinping
9. Chapter 9 Divide-and-Conquer Strategy and Political Sociology of the Dictator's Commitment Power in China
   Part IV Conclusions
10. Chapter 10 Conclusions