Voter Behavior in Economics Perspective

In this book voter behavior is analyzed from an economist's point of view. The influence of an economy on voter behavior is investigated and this behavior is analyzed in the perspective commonly used by economists. Econom(etr)ic tools are applied in the analyses. The book contains empirical analyses linking demographic variables to voter turnout and party choice using cross-section data for the Netherlands. Attention is focused on whether turnout and party choice decisions are taken sequentially or simultaneously by voters. An empirical test supports the former. Using these results, behavioral models of party choice and voter turnout are developed. Existing econometric analyses of voting behavior are put on a more solid theoretical footing. In both models a group perspective is used, in line with increased attention for this perspective in economics and political science. Empirical applications of the party choice model allow for an estimation of relative preferences for public goods, using the revealed preference mechanism provided by voting (intention). An alternative method for detecting these preferences, a new survey design, is discussed as well. In the turnout model, attention is fo- cused on the role of "civic duty" in a group context.

Contenu

I: Introducing the Subject.- 1. Introduction.- 1.1. Voter behavior and economics.- 1.2. An outline of the book.- 2. Existing Studies in the Field.- 2.1. Introduction.- 2.2. Economic analyses of voter behavior.- 2.3. Median voter models.- 2.4. Conclusions.- II: Empirical Models Applied to the Netherlands.- 3. An Empirical Analysis of Voter Turnout in the Netherlands.- 3.1. Introduction.- 3.2. Survey of the literature.- 3.3. Data and selection of variables.- 3.4. Multivariate analysis.- 3.5. Some special topics.- 3.5.1 A comparison of the voting behavior of partners.- 3.5.2 National versus local elections.- 3.6. Concluding remarks.- Appendix 3A.- Appendix 3B.- 4. An Empirical Analysis of Party Choice in the Netherlands.- 4.1. Introduction.- 4.2. The model.- 4.3. Characteristics of Dutch parties and expected effects of variables.- 4.3.1 Dutch party characteristics.- 4.3.2 Expected effects of the variables distinguished.- 4.4. Data and first results.- 4.4.1 The data.- 4.4.2 The sequential decision voter.- 4.4.3 Former party choice.- 4.5. The sequential versus the simultaneous decision voter.- 4.5.1 The simultaneous decision voter.- 4.5.2 The sequential versus the simultaneous decision model: a test.- 4.6. Some implications.- 4.6.1 The 'left-right' scale.- 4.6.2 Marginal effects.- 4.7. Concluding discussion.- Appendix 4A.- Appendix 4B.- Appendix 4C.- III: A Behavioral Model of Party Choice and the Demand for Public Goods.- 5. A Behavioral Model of Party Choice.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. The model.- 5.2.1 Individual versus group interests.- 5.2.2 Party choice.- 5.2.3 The reduced form equations.- 5.3. A comparison with existing models.- 5.3.1 Economic models: popularity functions.- 5.3.2 Other economic models.- 5.3.3 Spatial models of voting behavior.- 5.4. Concluding remarks.- Appendix 5A.- 6. Empirical Applications: the Demand for Public Goods.- 6.1. Introduction.- 6.2. An empirical application to the Netherlands.- 6.2.1 The equations to be estimated.- 6.2.2 The empirical results.- 6.3. An empirical application to Great Britain.- 6.3.1 The equations to be estimated.- 6.3.2 The results for workers.- 6.3.3 Other groups.- 6.3.4 Original parameters.- 6.4. Concluding remarks.- Appendix 6A.- 7. Expressed Preferences for Public Goods.- 7.1. Introduction.- 7.2. The survey method.- 7.3. Two surveys applied.- 7.3.1 The SCP-survey.- 7.3.2 The Amsterdam-survey.- 7.4. Conclusions.- IV: The Calculus of Voting.- 8. Voter Turnout and Social Pressure.- 8.1. Introduction.- 8.2. Optimal group behavior.- 8.3. Individual turnout I: producers of social pressure.- 8.4. Individual turnout II: consumers of social pressure.- 8.5. Concluding discussion.- Appendix 8A.- Appendix 8B.- Appendix 8C.- Appendix 8D.- 9. Some Implications of the Turnout Model.- 9.1. Introduction.- 9.2. Equilibrium analysis.- 9.3. Winner-takes-all elections.- 9.4. Empirics.- 9.4.1 Party or election specific variables.- 9.4.2 Socio-economic variables.- 9.5. Conclusion.- Appendix 9A.- Appendix 9B.- Appendix 9C.- Epilogue.- 10. Summary and Evaluation.- 10.1. Introduction.- 10.2. Summary.- 10.2.1 General summary of the book.- 10.2.2 Summary of Part II.- 10.2.3 Summary of Part III.- 10.2.4 Summary of Part IV.- 10.3. Evaluation.- 10.3.1 The importance of the group-framework.- 10.3.2 Voter turnout and party choice.- 10.3.3 The economic perspective.- References.- Author Index.- List of Symbols.