Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

The perfect introduction to contemporary epistemology, completely overhauled for its third edition

In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, pairs of specially commissioned essays defend opposing views on some of today's most compelling epistemological issues and problems. Offering a unique blend of accessibility and originality, this timely volume brings together fresh debates on hotly contested issues to provide readers with the opportunity to engage in comparative analysis of constantly changing and developing epistemological concepts.

Now in its third edition, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology features up-to-date coverage of the latest developments in the field. Entirely new essays examine questions of epistemic normativity and knowledge, the relationship between belief and credence, the possibility of internalist epistemology, epistemic instrumentalism, norms of assertion, the use of thought experiments in epistemology, and more.

• Presents a rigorous yet accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology
• Contains head-to-head chapters offering forceful advocacy of opposing philosophical stances
• Focuses on core areas of epistemology
• Uses a lively debate format that sharply defines the issues and encourages further discussion
• All-new chapters provide fully updated coverage of new and emerging topics in epistemology

Part of the Wiley-Blackwell Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition, remains an essential resource for advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, graduate students in philosophy, and epistemologists who want to keep current with contemporary epistemological debates.

Auteur
The Editors

BLAKE ROEBER is Thomas J. and Robert T. Rolfs Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He is Associate Editor of Philosophical Studies and has published in Nous, PPR, Mind, and other leading journals.

ERNEST SOSA is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, where he also serves on the Board of Governors. He is the author of numerous papers and books on epistemology and is the editor of Nous, Philosophical Issues, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

MATTHIAS STEUP is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He is the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology and numerous articles on epistemology. He is the editor of Knowledge, Truth, and Duty and the co-editor of A Companion to Epistemology.

JOHN TURRI is Professor and Canada Research Chair in Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Waterloo, where he directs the Philosophical Science Lab. He has published research in many leading philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science journals.

Contenu

Notes on Contributors vii Preface to the Third Edition xiii Preface to the Second Edition xiv Preface to the First Edition xv Introduction xvii 1 Does Knowledge Come First in Epistemology? 1 Knowledge Comes First 1 Mona Simion Known Unknowns and the Limits of Knowledge 7 Aidan McGlynn Knowledge Still Comes First 14 Mona Simion Circumstantial Luck and Knowledge-First Epistemology 16 Aidan McGlynn 2 Does Justification Supervene on the Internal? 23 Is Justification Just in the Head? 23 Clayton Littlejohn The Possibility of Internalist Epistemology 36 Kurt L. Sylvan 3 Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? 55 Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? No, Not Really 55 Matthew McGrath Suspension of Judgment Is a Question-Directed Attitude 66 Jane Friedman 4 Are There Practical Reasons for Belief? 79 There Are Practical Reasons for Belief 79 Susanna Rinard There Are No Practical Reasons for Belief 81 Thomas Kelly and Stewart Cohen Reply to and Kelly and Cohen 93 Susanna Rinard 5 Is Evidence Permissive? 103 Introductions and Stage-Setting 103 Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci A Permissive Notion of Rationality 105 Miriam Schoenfield We Are Not Mushy Permissivists and, Moreover, We Should Not Be 110 Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci Is the Disagreement Between Us Substantive? 116 Miriam Schoenfield A Final Plea for Impermissivism 121 Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci Some Final Thoughts 123 Miriam Schoenfield Permissivism and Metaepistemology 124 Sophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci, and Miriam Schoenfield 6 Does Fundamental Evidence Consist in Seemings? 127 Evidence Is Seemings 127 Michael Huemer Evidence Is Not Seemings 134 Maria Lasonen-Aarnio Four Challenges for Phenomenal Conservatism 142 Michael Huemer Preservative Memory and Trouble for Internalism 146 Maria Lasonen-Aarnio 7 Does Knowledge Exclude Luck? 151 Knowing Can Include Luck 151 Stephen Hetherington There Cannot Be Lucky Knowledge 159 Duncan Pritchard On Whether Knowing Can Include Luck: Asking the Correct Question 169 Stephen Hetherington Reply to Hetherington 171 Duncan Pritchard 8 Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Important for Epistemology? 175 Is the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction Superficial? 175 Timothy Williamson The Significance of A Priori Justification 183 Paul Boghossian Response to Boghossian 191 Timothy Williamson Reply to Williamson 194 Paul Boghossian 9 How Should We Use Thought Experiments in Epistemology? 201 How to Use Thought Experiments 201 Elijah Chudnoff A Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology 209 Wesley Buckwalter How to Think About How to Use Thought Experiments 218 Elijah Chudnoff Thinking About Using Thought Experiments: Further Questions 222 Wesley Buckwalter 10 Is Belief a Species of Credence? 229 Credences Are Degrees of Belief 229 Roger Clarke Is Belief Credence 1? Depends on What You Mean! 237 Julia Staffel Two in the Model, One in the Head 247 Roger Clarke 11 Is Epistemic Normativity Instrumental? 253 Epistemic Normativity Is Independent of Our Goals 253 Alex Worsnip Epistemic Normativity Is Not Independent of Our Goals 263 J. Adam Carter A Brief Reply to Carter 274 Alex Worsnip 12 Is Testimony a Basic Source of Justification? 279 A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony 279 Elizabeth Fricker Anti- Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony 290 Sanford C. Goldberg Comments on Sanford Goldberg's "Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony" 300 Elizabeth Fricker Comments on Elizabeth Fricker's "A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony" 301 Sanford C. Goldberg 13 Does Common Sense Conflict with Skepticism? 305 Skepticism Is Common Sense 305 Allan Hazlett Skepticism Is Not Common Sense 311 Krista Lawlor Reply to Lawlor 318 Allan Hazlett Reply to Hazlett 323 Krista Lawlor 14 Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? 329 Knowledge Is the Norm of Assertion 329 Matthew A. Benton Knowledge Is Not Our Norm of Assertion 339 Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen Index 355