This book examines the strategies adopted by local governments to obtain excess construction land quotas in the face of the central government's strict land management system. It applies game theory, principal-agent theory, collective action theory, and competition and collusion theory to analyze the trade-offs and constraints faced by local governments under the existing institutional framework. It also empirically tests the imitative competitive strategy of land violation and the institutional collusion strategy of land development rights trading using spatial panel model and Tobit model. The book reveals the internal mechanism behind local governments' simultaneous adoption of competitive and collusive strategies in pursuing local interests and economic growth. It also shows how local governments' land violations have significant strategic characteristics in time and space, and how economic development gap, resource endowment gap, and human network relationship influence their collusion formation in land development rights trading. This book is a valuable contribution to the literature on land management, local governance, and political economy in China. It is suitable for scholars, students, policy makers, and practitioners who are interested in understanding the complex dynamics of land development in China. The book is written in an accessible and engaging style, with clear explanations of theoretical concepts and empirical methods.

Provides an insightful explanation of the complex dynamics of land management and political economy in China Presents a comprehensive theoretical framework to analyze local governments' land overdevelopment strategies in China Covers mechanisms behind local governments adopting both competitive and collusive strategies in land overdevelopment

Autorentext

Dr. Xuewen Li is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Urban Development & Management at the School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University. He graduated from the Department of Mathematics at Southeast University and obtained his Master's degree and Doctoral degree from Zhejiang University and Huazhong University of Science and Technology, respectively, before joining Zhejiang University. Dr. Li's research focuses on local government behavior, urban development and economic growth, as well as urban-rural integration and the spatial structural evolution of economic activities. He has completed several major projects, including the National Natural Science Foundation of China project titled "Theoretical Exploration and Empirical Research on the Path of Urban-Rural Integration in the Era of E-commerce" (Project No. 71603234), the Youth Project of the Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of the Ministry of Education, the Special Grant Project of the China Postdoctoral Foundation, and the General Project of the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation, among others. Currently, he is leading research on the National Science Foundation of China project titled "Research on Regional and Urban Cooperation and Development from the Perspective of the Enclave Economy: Theoretical Mechanism, Empirical Evaluation, and Policy Optimization" (Project No. 72074192) and is also involved in the sub-topic "Research on the Urbanization of Undeveloped Counties Under the Goal of Absorbing Local Agricultural Migrant Populations" as part of the National Social Science Major Project titled "Promoting the Urbanization of Counties." He has published numerous papers in leading Chinese and international SSCI/SCI journals, including Management World, China Economic Quarterly, World Economy, Rural Economy in China, Land Science in China, Local Government Studies, Land Use Policy, and Land, among others. His paper "Local Government and Extra-Budgetary Income: The Problem of China's Economic Growth Model" published in World Economy was reprinted by Xinhua Digest and China Social Science Excellence and won the Second Prize at the 9th Hubei Provincial Social Science Outstanding Achievement Award (Paper).

Inhalt

Land Overdevelopment by Local Governments under Strict Control of Construction Land Quotas.- The Logic of Land Overdevelopment by Local Governments.- The Inevitability of Overdevelopment of Land by Local Governments: A Simple Game Analysis.- Imitative Competition: Illegal Land Use by Local Governments.- Institutional Collusion: Land Development Rights Trading.- Land Overdevelopment and Local Economic Growth.- Land Overdevelopment and Protection of Arable land.- Governance of Local Governments' Land Overdevelopment - An Extended Discussion.