Analyses the uses and limitations of the principal-agent model in the study of EU politics

Moves beyond old principal-agent models to understand ever more complex realities within the EU

Offers a thorough empirical analysis covering a variety of policy fields and political actors

Autorentext

Tom Delreux is Professor of EU Politics at the Institut de Sciences Politiques Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE) at the University of Louvain (Louvain-la-Neuve), Belgium.

Johan Adriaensen is Research Coordinator at the Center for European Research in Maastricht (CERiM) at Maastricht University, the Netherlands.

Inhalt
Preface - Mark Pollack.- 1. Introduction - Tom Delreux and Johan Adriaensen .- 2. The principal-agent model, accountability and democratic legitimacy - Gijs Jan Brandsma and Johan Adriaensen .- 3. Non-exclusive delegation to the European External Action Service - Hylke Dijkstra.- 4. Direct and indirect control on the Council by the European Council - Daniella Kroll .- 5. Effects of contestation within a collective agent in EU trade policy-making - Markus Gastinger .- 6. Agent interaction as a source of discretion for the High Representative - Niklas Helwig.- 7. Impact of the agent's environment on discretion in the field of EU conflict resolution - Arne Niemann and Friedrich Planck .- 8. Multiple principals preferences, different types of oversight mechanisms, and agent's discretion in trade negotiations - Eugenia da Conceicão-Heldt.- 9. Agents as information asymmetry managers in EU trade policy-making - Evelyn Coremans and Bart Kerremans.- 10. Process-tracing as a tool to analyse discretion - Yf Reekers and Derek Beach .- 11. Conclusions - Johan Adriaensen and Tom Delreux.- Index.