Zusatztext "Anyone interested in understanding the United States Air Force's bombing operations in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan over the past decade should begin by reading this book. Today's aircraft and weapons differ dramatically from those used over the western front in World War I, but--as Tami Davis Biddle points out--ideas about strategic bombing from that era have remained remarkably resilient. . . . Biddle's work should be read by anyone interested in understanding the shaping of ideas behind the use of military force and how these ideas ultimately affect political decisions." ---Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., American Diplomacy Informationen zum Autor Tami Davis Biddle is Associate Professor of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College. She teaches military and diplomatic history, national security policy, and grand strategy. Her research focuses on the evolution of military ideas, and their implementation as strategies for national defense and methods of warfighting. Klappentext A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing, this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on--and gained validity from--widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social and political context of the day and were maintained largely through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged. Biddle analyzes how a particular interpretation of the World War I experience, together with airmen's organizational interests, shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing. They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible. Combining narrative with analysis, this book presents the first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas--not only as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary warfare. Zusammenfassung Examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. This book argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on - and gained validity from - widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. Inhaltsverzeichnis Acknowledgments vii Introduction 1 Chapter One The Beginning: Strategic Bombing in the First World War 11 Chapter Two Britain in the Interwar Years 69 Chapter Three The United States in the Interwar Years 128 Chapter Four Rhetoric and Reality! 1939-1942 176 Chapter Five The Combined Bomber Offensive! 1943-1945 214 Conclusion 289 Notes 303 Bibliography of Archival Sources 387 Index 391 ...

Autorentext

Tami Davis Biddle

Klappentext

A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing, this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on--and gained validity from--widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social and political context of the day and were maintained largely through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged. Biddle analyzes how a particular interpretation of the World War I experience, together with airmen's organizational interests, shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing. They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible. Combining narrative with analysis, this book presents the first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas--not only as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary warfare.

Zusammenfassung
Examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. This book argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on - and gained validity from - widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment.

Inhalt
Acknowledgments vii Introduction 1 Chapter One The Beginning: Strategic Bombing in the First World War 11 Chapter Two Britain in the Interwar Years 69 Chapter Three The United States in the Interwar Years 128 Chapter Four Rhetoric and Reality, 1939-1942 176 Chapter Five The Combined Bomber Offensive, 1943-1945 214 Conclusion 289 Notes 303 Bibliography of Archival Sources 387 Index 391