Questions about the relationship between autonomy and authority are raised in nearly every area of moral philosophy. Although the most ob vious of these is political philosophy (especially the philosophy of law), the issues surrounding this relationship are by no means confined to this area. Indeed, as we shall see as this work progresses, the issues raised are central to moral psychology, religion, professional ethics, medical ethics, and the nature of moral systems generally. Although the title of this work is Autonomy. Authority and Moral Responsibility. we shall be concerned with the more general question about the relationship between autonomy (or self-direction) and exter nal influences, which I take to be any guide to behavior whose presence, content or substance is dependent upon something beyond the control of the agent. Something is beyond the control of the agent if the agent cannot determine whether or not it is present, what its content consists of, or whether or not (or in what way) it influences her. These "external" influences may include (but are not necessarily limited to) religious con victions (which guide behavior according to a doctrine whose content is established independently of the agent); moral obligations (which re quire action in accordance with some moral theory); and desires for ob jects or states of affairs whose presence (or absence) is beyond the con trol of the agent. Of course, external influences may also include the requirements of authority or law.

Klappentext

This book offers a model for understanding autonomy in the context of the practical uses of this concept for applied ethics and political philosophy, and in particular for our understanding of moral responsibility. The first half of the book develops a concept of autonomy understood in terms of the Aristotelian notion of `helmsmanship', and argues that autonomy must be understood in these terms if it is to serve a useful role for practical issues in applied ethics. The second half of the book delves into our understanding of autonomy and its relationship to various forms of authority, especially law. Along the way, it explores the threat which a variety of forms of obligation might and might not pose to autonomy, and offers a model for understanding the limits which must be placed on authority if it is to remain consistent with autonomy.

Inhalt
One: Autonomy.- One: The Importance of Autonomy.- Two: The Concept of Autonomy.- Three: Developing the Helmsman Metaphor.- Four: Addressing Kant's Concerns.- Two: Authority.- Five: Autonomy and Normative Obligation.- Six: Authority and Obligation.- Seven: Autonomy and the Authority of Law.