This book is a foreign policy analysis of institutional interaction between American policy making bodies (State Department, Pentagon and White House) and the Foreign Office & Pakistan Army'- has both shaped and enriched my interest in the area.

This book examines, through the use of archives and oral evidence, the role of the Pakistan Army in the context of Pakistan's foreign policy and domestic politics. Focusing on its independent relationship with three instruments of policy-making in the United States State Department, White House and Pentagon the theory argues that the relationship between the Army and these policy-making bodies arose from a synergistic commonality of interests during 1947-65. The Americans needed a country, on the periphery of the Soviet Union to contain Communism while the Pakistan needed US military support to check Indian regional military hegemonism in South Asia. This alliance was secured to the disadvantage of democratic political institutions of Pakistan. The Army, which became stronger as a result of US military and economic support, came progressively to dominate domestic politics. This led not only to weakened civilian governments in the period under examination but also, in 1958, to the military seizure of political control of the country itself. Religion, the foundation of the creation of the country, failed to keep the East and West wings of Pakistan united. The book explores the influence of the martial-race theory and and reconstructs provincial politics that weakened the Federal Government and allowed the Army to usurp political power to a disproportionate degree. The complications arising in Indo-Pakistan relations as a consequence of an abrupt tilt of the US towards India after the Sino-Indian war in 1962 are also examined. This resulted in China-Pakistan friendship. In conclusion, the book argues that the period under consideration saw a complete failure of the US policy of containing communism while at the same time avoiding war between its allies in the region, and that this had tragic consequences for the future of democracy in Pakistan.

Autorentext

Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi is a Professor, Chairman of the Department of International Relations, and former Director of the IPCS at the University of Peshawar. He completed his MS and PhD from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He remained a fellow of Fulbright, Carnegie, Charles Wallace, and Edinburgh University. He taught at the Fulbright Commission, Bulgaria (2010-2014). Dr. Soherwordi has written more than fifty research papers and four books. His commentaries have been featured widely in Pakistan and international media.

Inhalt

Abstract - Acknowledgements - List of Maps - List of Tables/Illustrations/Figures - Acronyms - Pashto-Urdu-English Glossary - Introduction - Advent and Evolution: The Pakistan Army from the British Indian Army: 1857-1947 - Weak Political Institutions and the Rise of the Army in Pakistan: 1947-58 - American Policymaking Bodies and the Pakistan Army: Towards Military Alliances: 1947-57 - Military Rule in Pakistan and India as a Factor in Straining the Pak- US Institutional Interaction: 1958- 62 - Allies at Loggerheads: The US and the Pakistan Army: 1962-65 - Conclusion - Epilogue -Bibliography - Index.