Lobbying from within: Interest Groups in the Swiss Parliament

In Swiss politics, federal politicians often wear several hats: they represent their voters but also serve as leaders or advisers in interest groups. These formal ties, long viewed with suspicion, have fueled the image of parliamentarians as puppets of organized interests. This book challenges that view. By comparing how politicians and citizens voted on issues decided both in the National Council and at the ballot box, it shows that formal ties rarely lead politicians to vote against their electorate, since group positions usually align with ­ voters. Yet an analysis of 130 policy debates reveals a clear ­ imbalance: business groups enjoy stronger parliamentary presence than citizen groups, especially in the Council of States and in ­ legislative committees. The real risk of formal ties lies not in vote ­ capture but in unequal access. With greater resources, ­ business groups can cultivate more ties and rely on allies to introduce amendments, an advantage citizen groups struggle to match.

Autorentext
Steven Eichenberger is a lecturer in Swiss politics and public policy at the University of Geneva. He holds a PhD from the University of Lausanne and was a visiting researcher at the University of Montreal. He teaches quantitative methods, and his research focuses on interest groups, lobbying, political representation, and expert advice to decision-makers.