A collection of essays that ties together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks' research on social choice and strategic decisions. It examines the strategic aspects of political decision-making, including the choices of voters in committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns, and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from game-theoretic analysis to empirical investigation and experimental testing.

Presentation of strategic aspects of social decision-making Using game-theoretic, experimental and econometric methods

Inhalt
and Overview.- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates.- Local Political Equilibria.- Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information.- Party Objectives in the Divide a Dollar Electoral Competition.- Generalized Bandit Problems.- The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems.- Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining.- Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities.- Testing Theories of Lawmaking.- Deliberation and Voting Rules.