Reform Processes and Policy Change examines the role of veto players in political reform in addition to more recent developments in theoretical and empirical progress. The volume comprises of international examples from experts in the field of veto player theory, across the globe.

George Tsebelis' veto players approach has become a prominent theory to analyze various research questions in political science. Studies that apply veto player theory deal with the impact of institutions and partisan preferences of legislative activity and policy outcomes. It is used to measure the degree of policy change and, thus, reform capacity in national and international political systems. This volume contains the analysis of leading scholars in the field on these topics and more recent developments regarding theoretical and empirical progress in the area of political reform-making. The contributions come from research areas of political science where veto player theory plays a significant role, including, positive political theory, legislative behavior and legislative decision-making in national and supra-national political systems, policy making and government formation. The contributors to this book add to the current scholarly and public debate on the role of veto players, making it of interest to scholars in political science and policy studies as well as policymakers worldwide.

Examines the role of veto players in the collective decision-making process Includes contributions from experts in the field of veto player theory Provides international examples from a global assemblage of contributors Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Inhalt
Dynamizing Veto Player Theory: How Veto Player Theory Can be Used as a Starting Point for a More Comprehensive Model of the Policy Process.- Do Veto Players Have Veto Power?.- Veto Player Theory Revisited: Low Policy Reform Capacity in Parliamentary Democracies with Strong Government.- Veto Players: How Can We Measure Their Policy Preferences.- Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting.- Who is Powerful in the EU Legislative Process? A New Approach.- The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies.- Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: Opportunities, Conflict and Institutional Constraints.- Testing the Theories of Law Making in a Parliamentary Democracy: A Roll Call Analysis of the Italian Chamber of Deputies.- Veto Players and Environmental Regulation: Assessing the Impact of Institutional and Positional Factors for Policy Change in 24 Countries.- Conditional Veto Player Effects in Tax Policy.- Guarding Status Quo or Amplifying Change? Veto-Players and Welfare State Reforms.- The Veto Player Approachy in Comparative Politics: Concepts and Explanatory Power.- Annoying, but Pacifying: Veto Players and the Onset of Civil War.- Veto Players, Bargaining and the Empirical Analysis of EU Policy Making: A Quantal Response Approach.- Mutual Veto?; How Coalitions Work.- Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945-1999