It is not unusual that formal and informal discussions about the political system, its virtues, and its many defects, conclude in a discussion about impartiality. In fact, we all discuss impartiality when we talk about the best way to equally consider all viewpoints. We show our concerns with impartiality when, facing a particular problem, we try to figure out the best solution for all of us, given our conflicting interests. Thus, the quest for impartiality tends to be a common objective for most of us, although we normally disagree on its particular contents. Generally, these formal and informal discussions about impartiality conclude in a dispute between different "epistemic" conceptions. That is to say, simply, that in these situations we begin to disagree about best procedure to defme the more neutral, impartial solution for all of us.! Basically, trying to answer this question we tend to fluctuate between two opposite positions. According to some, the best way to know which is the more impartial solution is to resort to a process of collective reflection: in those situations we have to consider the opinions of all those who are possibly affected.

Klappentext

This book explores the origins of Anglo-American Constitutionalism, from both a philosophical and a historical perspective. It attempts to show that the institutional mechanisms incorporated into the American Constitution were modeled under a strong bias against collective discussion. The book also examines the alternative institutional system then proposed by a different and more radical tradition of thought, and evaluates this alternative from the ideal of a deliberate democracy. The Scepter of Reason challenges much of the current academic literature on the philosophical foundations of modern constitutionalism, and advances suggestions for a different approach. It will be particularly attractive for legal scholars, political scientists, and graduate and undergraduate students interested in Constitutional Theory, Anglo-American History, and Democratic Theory.

Inhalt
1 Radicalism and Conservatism in England.- The Authority of the People Outside the Parliament.- The Crisis of Political Representation.- The Radical Societies in England.- The Radicals' Epistemic View, and their Egalitarianism.- The Radicals' Institutional Proposals.- The Conservative Challenge.- When Thomas Paine Confronted Edmund Burke.- 2 Radicalism and Populism in the U.S..- A Government for the Majority.- Town Meetings and County Conventions 29 The Constitution of Pennsylvania: The Experiment of Unchecked Majorities.- The Constitution of Pennsylvania in Motion.- The Critical Period of American History.- The Context of the Crisis.- The Demand for Paper Money and Counter-Institutional Reactions.- Institutional Responses to the Majority Claims.- The Paper-Money Crisis in Rhode Island.- The Critics of Radicalism/Populism.- 3 The Conservative Reaction. James Madison: Institutional Reforms Against The Power of Factions.- The Evolution of Madison's Ideas of Factions. Earlier Approaches.- Defining the Vices of the Political System.- Analyzing the Madisonian Definition of Factions.- Representation.- Minorities.- Checks and Balances.- The Problems of the System of Checks and Balances.- 4 The Conservative Reaction II. Defending the New Institutions in the Federal Convention.- The Conservative Antifederalists.- The Federalists.- The North American Constitution and Epistemic Elitism.- About Popular Assemblies and the House of Representatives.- Some Basic Tools.- The Executive.- The Senate.- The Judiciary.- 5 The Conservative Model of Deliberation.- Why Deliberation? What Kind of Deliberation?.- The Elitist Character of the Conservative Model of Deliberation.- Why Restricted Deliberation?.- Radicalism and Public Deliberation.- Why PublicDeliberation?.- Appendix Contemporary Political Institutions and Deliberation.- The Possibility of Deliberation.- The Judiciary and Public Dialogue.- The Political Branches of Government and Deliberation.- We the People and Interbranch Dialogue.- Final Notes.