Prior's view on intensionality and truth is based on the principle that sentences never name, that what sentences say cannot be otherwise signified, that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence, and that sentential quantification is neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The text defends each of these principles.

Inhalt
I. Propositions.- Prior's Core Theory.- Is Prior A Nominalist?.- Prior On Truth - A First Look.- II. Comparisons.- Frege and Prior Onintensional Contexts.- Prior, Frege and Bealer On Types.- Fodor and Prior on Propositional Attitudes.- Davidson and Prior on Indirect Quotation.- Davidson on the Trviality of Truth.- Quine and Prior on Quantification.- III. Quantification and Generalization.- On Understanding Quantification.- A Problem for Prior.- A Possible Solution.- An Alternative Approach.- A Model Theory For Sentential Quantification.- IV. Truth.- Priors Theory Of Truth and Falsehood.- Non-Objective Truth.- Truth Value Gaps and Truth.- Notes.- References.- Name Index.