Zusatztext 53035160 Informationen zum Autor Peter W. Rodman was a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. He served as deputy assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, as special assistant to Henry Kissinger in the White House, and, most recently, as assistant secretary of defense of international security affairs (20012007). Rodman is the author of More Precious Than Peace . He died in August 2008. Klappentext An official in the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and both Bush administrations, Peter W. Rodman draws on his firsthand knowledge of the Oval Office to explore the foreign-policy leadership of every president from Nixon to George W. Bush. This riveting and informative book about the inner workings of our government is rich with anecdotes and fly-on-the-wall portraits of presidents and their closest advisors. It is essential reading for historians, political junkies, and for anyone in charge of managing a large organization.Chapter One Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Legitimacy There is a famous story of President Abraham Lincoln, taking a vote in a cabinet meeting on whether to sign the Emancipation Proclamation. All his cabinet secretaries vote nay, whereupon Lincoln raises his right hand and declares: The ayes have it! The story is apocryphal, but it well captures the truth of Lincoln's relations with his cabinet. That cabinet included supremely ambitious men, substantial political figures in their own right, several of whom had sought the presidency in 1860 and remained convinced that they, not the country lawyer from Illinois, should be sitting in his chair. Yet Lincoln came to dominate this team of rivals and seized the responsibility that was inescapably his. Such a story brings a smile when the president under discussion is the most revered political leader in the history of the republic. But our modern political culture and sensibility are more ambivalent. When less revered presidents make controversial decisions, what do we really believe about presidential authority? How do we feel, for example, about Richard Nixon overruling the dissent of both his secretary of state and his secretary of defense to order military escalations that he thought essential to prosecute the Vietnam War? What do we think of Ronald Reagan pursuing what he thought was a strategic opening with Iran, over the objection of his chief cabinet officers? With respect to the very public anguish of Secretary of State Colin Powell and his State Department over George W. Bush's decisions on Iraq, do we identify with Bush or with Powell? How often do we read in the press about White House interference in the work of experts in the departments and agencies, and complaints that their work is being politicized? One part of our brain seems to side with the permanent government. In the age of the whistle-blower, what do we really think about a president's authority to decide and carry out policies with which subordinates disagree? The answer should not depend simply on one's own policy or partisan preferences. There ought to be neutral principles, not only to guide the public discourse but also to guide presidents. The modern trend, especially since the United States emerged from World War II as a global power, has been to expand the White House staff and institutions like the National Security Council (NSC) precisely to enable more centralized control, or at least better central coordination, over an expanding policy community. That policy community includes traditional cabinet departments with an international role (State, Defense, Treasury), other institutions (the Central Intelligence Agency, the uniformed military, and agencies in charge of trade and foreign aid policy), and departments and agencies only recently playing an important ro...

ldquo;A brilliant tutorial on the way presidents, regardless of party or ideology, have struggled to control the vast national security bureaucracy they inherit after taking the oath of office.”
—Wall Street Journal

“Presidential Command should be on the short list of readings for members of the Barack Obama administration—as much for its pointing out the mistakes to avoid as for illustrating the procedures to emulate.” —Gary Hart, The New York Times Book Review

“A guide about what works, and what doesn’t, when it comes to making successful and effective national security policy.” —The Washington Times
 
“In an age of sensational leaks and headline-grabbing exposés that illuminate very little, it is bracing to read Peter Rodman’s calm and reasoned dissection of foreign policy over the course of several recent administrations, which illuminates very much. His is the quiet voice of wisdom.” —Robert D. Kaplan, author of Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos

“Outstanding. . . . On target. . . . Timely. . . . Rodman’s experience in five of the presidencies he discusses, and his lucid style, keep the focus on reality and the narrative lively. . . . [His] studiously evenhanded and balanced style makes his zingers even more telling when they explode on the page, and he is especially acute assessing Republican administrations in which he served.” —National Review
 
“Fascinating and insightful.” —Richmond Times-Dispatch
 
“Surprisingly fun. . . . Rodman moves along briskly, mixing insidery dish with lucid analysis.” —Bloomberg News
 
 “This masterful series of studies, by one of America’s most gifted and sensitive national security analysts, merges a scrupulous taste for clarity with a broad and humane vision of the American national interest. It is enlightening, penetrating and always fascinating.” —Philip Bobbitt, author of Terror and Consent
 
“[Presidential Command] brings to bear the qualified judgment of someone who in many cases was actually there. . . . [Rodman] has bequeathed his country a priceless legacy. One can only hope that administrations present and future will make good use of it.” —The American Spectator
 
“Pungent, provocative, perspicacious. . . . An incisive, in-depth, and often firsthand examination of the successes and failures of the last seven administrations.” —Tulsa World
 
“Invaluable. . . . Rodman casts a cold light on a number of established clichés about foreign policy conflicts. . . . But at its heart this book is about more than foreign policy. In the end, Presidential Command is about the central problem of democratic government today in all fields of policy.” —The Weekly Standard
 
“Telling. . . . Rich in detail.” —The National Interest
 
“Rodman [had] a close-up look at the process of governmental decision-making—and the bureaucratic elbowing that the process usually entails. . . . His rankings of presidential performance pack interest.” —St. Louis Post-Dispatch
 
“Observers of the new Obama administration and its inaugural moves in foreign affairs should find lessons in Rodman’s experienced outlook.” —Booklist
 
“Peter Rodman was incisive, wise, and fair and these qualities are reflected in his revealing, timely, and truly important account of how our recent presidents both succeeded and failed in exercising strategic ‘command’ over U.S. foreign policy.” —Zbigniew Brzezinski

Autorentext

Peter W. Rodman was a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. He served as deputy assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, as direc…