Zusatztext Carruthers offers a robust antidote to dominant views about self-Knowledge. In particular, Carruthers bracingly takes aim at any theory of self-knowledge on which we have transparent introspective access even to our current propositional attitudes and affective states. ... a challenging and provocative book, informed by an extraordinary knowledge of scientific psychology and cognitive science. Informationen zum Autor Peter Carruthers is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. He has published widely across different areas of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. His books include The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought (Oxford University Press, 2006), Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2000), and seven co-edited collections of original interdisciplinary essays. Klappentext It is widely believed that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. The Opacity of Mind challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate "explanatory space." The book argues that our access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness of our own circumstances and behavior, together with our own sensory imagery (including inner speech). In fact our access to our own thoughts is no different in principle from our access to the thoughts of other people, utilizing the conceptual and inferential resources of the same "mindreading" faculty, and relying on many of the same sources of evidence. Peter Carruthers proposes and defends the Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. This is supported through comprehensive examination of many different types of evidence from across cognitive science, integrating a diverse set of findings into a single well-articulated theory. One outcome is that there are hardly any kinds of conscious thought. Another is that there is no such thing as conscious agency. Zusammenfassung Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency. Inhaltsverzeichnis List of Figures and Tables Preface Acknowledgements 1: Introduction 2: The Mental Transparency Assumption 3: The ISA Theory: Foundations and Elaborations 4: Transparent Sensory Access to Attitudes? 5: Transparent Sensory Access to Affect 6: Intermediate-Strength Transparent-Access Theories 7: Inner Sense Theories 8: Mindreading in Mind 9: Metacognition and Control 10: Dissociation Data 11: Self-Interpretation and Confabulation 12: Conclusion and Implications References Index of Names Index of Subjects ...

Autorentext
Peter Carruthers is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. He has published widely across different areas of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. His books include The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought (Oxford University Press, 2006), Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2000), and seven co-edited collections of original interdisciplinary essays.

Klappentext

It is widely believed that people have privileged and authoritative access to their own thoughts, and many theories have been proposed to explain this supposed fact. The Opacity of Mind challenges the consensus view and subjects the theories in question to critical scrutiny, while showing that they are not protected against the findings of cognitive science by belonging to a separate "explanatory space." The book argues that our access to our own thoughts is almost always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness of our own circumstances and behavior, together with our own sensory imagery (including inner speech). In fact our access to our own thoughts is no different in principle from our access to the thoughts of other people, utilizing the conceptual and inferential resources of the same "mindreading" faculty, and relying on many of the same sources of evidence. Peter Carruthers proposes and defends the Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge. This is supported through comprehensive examination of many different types of evidence from across cognitive science, integrating a diverse set of findings into a single well-articulated theory. One outcome is that there are hardly any kinds of conscious thought. Another is that there is no such thing as conscious agency.

Zusammenfassung
Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.

Inhalt

• List of Figures and Tables

• Preface

• Acknowledgements

• 1: Introduction

• 2: The Mental Transparency Assumption

• 3: The ISA Theory: Foundations and Elaborations

• 4: Transparent Sensory Access to Attitudes?

• 5: Transparent Sensory Access to Affect

• 6: Intermediate-Strength Transparent-Access Theories

• 7: Inner Sense Theories

• 8: Mindreading in Mind

• 9: Metacognition and Control

• 10: Dissociation Data

• 11: Self-Interpretation and Confabulation

• 12: Conclusion and Implications

• References

• Index of Names

• Index of Subjects