This book proposes a new set of concepts in epistemology and philosophy of science and provides a novel account of theory change using the notions of epistemic vulnerability, asymmetric fallibilism, and epistemic verisimilitude in a non-Popperian sense. The examination of the notion of epistemic vulnerability is inspired by a dissatisfaction with classical fallibilism as it unnecessarily emphasizes the possibility of error rather than the possibility of epistemic success in its various forms (truth, fruitful mistakes, etc.). The book follows this up by providing a different approach to theory change in science using the notion of increasing degrees of epistemic verisimilitude in which empirical and pragmatic successes go hand in hand with different kinds of error. As a consequence, it proposes a distinctive epistemological stance towards the history of science, namely, that of an epistemological agnosticism cum rational epistemic hope. This new model of theory change, and its application to several moments in the history of science, provides the groundwork for criticizing the main arguments in favor of realism, anti-realism, and semi-realism. The account that is put forward avoids the main flaws of these three contenders but collects many of their virtues. This new approach and the laid groundwork make the book a valuable asset for researchers in epistemology and philosophy of science, including professional philosophers and post-graduate students.

Develops conceptual tools for deconstructing the foundations of realist, anti-realist, and semi-realist approaches Provides a new account of theory change using the notions of epistemic vulnerability and epistemic verisimilitude Of importance to researchers in epistemology and philosophy of science, as well as professional philosophers

Autorentext

Óscar L. González-Castán has since 2021 been Full Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy, Complutense University of Madrid. He studied Philosophy at the Complutense University of Madrid and was awarded an MA in 1987 and a PhD in Philosophy in 1993. He has been Adjunct Professor at the University of Saint Louis at the College of Arts and Letters (Madrid Campus, 19941995), at the College for International Studies, Endicott College (19952001), and at the University of Alcalá, Spain (19972001), as well as Lecturer at the Complutense University of Madrid (20062021). He was an International Research Assistant at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 19891990 and was awarded a post-doctoral scholarship at the University of Notre Dame (Indiana) in 19921993. He has also been Visiting Philosopher at the University of Oxford several times thanks to a grant from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Culture (Mobility Program for University Professors 2016) and the invitation of Professor Timothy Williamson (Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford). More recently, he has been Visiting Scholar in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) with support from the Complutense University-Jaime del Amo Foundation (2018).

Since 1996 he has been a Research Fellow in a number of different competitive Research Projects. At present, he is the PI of the Research Project Cognitive Vulnerability (II): Interest, Inquiry, and Asymmetric Knowledge of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (PID2022-138306NB-100). He has also been Vice-Dean of Studies in the Faculty of Philosophy of the Complutense University of Madrid (20102014). He established the Double Degree in Philosophy and Law.

His areas of interest include epistemology, philosophy of science, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind. He has published books and several articles on these subjects in international journals such as Tecnos, Rodopi, Wittgenstein Studien, The Journal of Value Inquiry, Phänomenologische Forschung, Trotta, De Gruyter, Plaza y Valdés, Teorema, Isegoría, and Revista de Filosofía among others. His books include Wandering Consciousness: A Critical Introduction to Philosophy of Psychology (in Spanish) (Madrid: Tecnos 1999), and The Many Directions of Moral Consciousness (in Spanish) (Madrid: Universidad de Alcalá 2003). His most recent book is:

González-Castán, Óscar L. (ed.) (2023), Cognitive Vulnerability: AnEpistemological Approach, in Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research, Günter Abel and James Conant (series editors). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. ISBN: 978-3-11-079906-4.

Inhalt

Introduction.- Part I: Epistemic Vulnerability and Its Consequences.- 2 Epistemic Vulnerability: Between Fallibilism and Epistemic Success.- 3 The New Plato (I): The Second Voyage of Philosophy on Truth and the Strongest Discourses.- 4 The New Plato (II): A Pragmatist Conception of the Role of Our Strongest Discourses.- 5 Epistemic Verisimilitude: Structural Elements.- 6 Epistemic Verisimilitude, Justification, and Truth.- Part II: Increasing Degrees of Epistemic Verisimilitude .- 7 Epistemic Verisimilitude and Asymmetric Fallibilism.- 8 The Sources of the Increasing Epistemic Verisimilitude of our Theories.- 9 Increasing Epistemic Verisimilitude and the Relay Race Problem.- 10 A Historically Accurate Epistemic Grinder Machine.- 11 The Flaws of Realism and Antirealism .- 12 A Critique of Chakravartty's Requirements for Semirealism.- Epilogue.- Index.