Klappentext

In the winter of 2021, the Swedish Nobel Foundation organized a Nobel symposium 'One Hundred Years of Game Theory' to commemorate the publication of famous mathematician Emile Borel's 'La théorie du jeu et les équations intégrales à noyau symétrique'. The symposium gathered roughly forty of the world's most prominent scholars ranging from mathematical foundations to applications in economics, political science, computer science, biology, sociology, and other fields. One Hundred Years of Game Theory brings together their writings to summarize and put in perspective the main achievements of game theory in the last one hundred years. They address past achievements, taking stock of what has been accomplished and contemplating potential future developments and challenges. Offering cross-disciplinary discussions between eminent researchers including five Nobel laureates, one Fields medalist and two Gödel prize winners, the contributors provide a fascinating landscape of game theory and its wide range of applications.

Inhalt

One hundred years of game theory; a Nobel symposium Mark Voorneveld, Jorgen W. Weibull, Tommy Andersson, Roger Myerson, Jean-Francois Laslier, Rida Laraki, Yukio Koriyama; Part I. The Early History of Game Theory from Borel: 1. Introduction Francoise Forges; 2. The games of Borel and chance Laurent Mazliak; 3. Von Neumann, Morgenstern and their creation of game theory, 1900-1960 Robert Leonard; 4. Borel and the foundation of game theory Roger Myerson; Part II. Mathematics of Game Theory and Its Foundations: 5. Introduction Bernhard Von Stengel; 6. On mean field games Pierre-Louis Lions; 7. Value and equilibrium Sylvain Sorin; 8. Refinements of Nash equilibrium Robert Wilson; Part III. Population Dynamics, Learning, and Biology: 9. Introduction Lawrence Blume; 10. Adjustment dynamics for human players Michihiro Kandori; 11. Game theory in biology; ideas, successes, and challenges Olof Leimar; 12. The dynamics of evolutionary game theory Karl Sigmund; Part IV Computer Science: 13. Introduction Felix Brandt and Eva Tardos; 14. Non-concave games: a challenge for game theory's next 100 years Constantinos Daskalakis; 15. Fairness in approval-based multiwinner voting Edith Elkind; 16. Stochastic choice and dynamics based on pairwise comparisons Felix Brandt; 17. Truthful mechanism design for computationally hard resource allocation Paul Milgrom; 18. Impossibility in game dynamics Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou, Georgios Piliouras and Kelly Spendlove; 19. The state of representing and solving games Tuomas Sandholm; Part V. Economics and Institutional Design: 20. Introduction Tommy Andersson; 21 Game theory and practical market design: how big, unobserved strategy sets brought cooperative and non-cooperative game theory together Alvin E. Roth; 22. Learning and equilibrium refinements Drew Fudenberg; Part VI. Individual Behavior in Strategic Interactions: 23. Introduction Mark Voorneveld; 24. Empirical evidence about individual behavior in games Colin F. Camerer; 25. From rationalistic to descriptive game theory Eric van Damme; 26. Social preferences and strategic interactions Ernst Fehr and Julien Senn; Part VII. Political Science: 27. Introduction Yukio Koriyama; 28. Game theory in political science: voting, elections and information aggregation David Austen-Smith; 29. Game theory and explanations for armed conflict James D. Fearon; 30. Applications of game theory in the political economy of trade policy Gene M. Grossman; Part VIII. Human Society: 31. Introduction Kaushik Basu; 32. Conflict, cooperation and innovation in the evolution of human societies Daron Acemoglu; 33. Laws and norms in games humans play Avinash Dixit; 34. Game theory in cultural evolution Joseph Henrich.