New Institutional Economics open a new methodological perspective in political economy by posing the question of why economic institutions are created. This state-of-the-art collection examines this question of Arrow's looking at how these man-made constraints condition political, economic and social integration both informally and formally. New developments in game theory are applied to many case topical studies including corruption, central bank independence, globalization and other issues in contemporary economic governance.

Autorentext

MICHELE BAGELLA Director, Department of Economics and Institutions, University of Rome Tor Vergata' LEONARDO BECCHETTI Doctor of Research and M.Sc. (LSE), Department of Economics and Institutions University of Rome Tor Vergata' ANDREA BERARDI Researcher, Banca Comerciale Italiana, Milan and London Business School, London GIOVANNI CARAVALE Professor of Economics, University of Rome La Sapienza' ALBERTO DALMAZZO Researcher, Department of Economics, University of Siena CARLO DELL'ARINGA Professor of Economics, Catholic University, Milan AVINASH K. DIXIT Professor of Economics, Princetown University FABIO GOBBO Professor of Economics, University of Bologna and member of Italy's Authority for Competition and the Market BRUNO JOSSA Professor of Political Economics, University of Naples GIANCARLO MARINI Professor of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata' MANCUR OLSON Professor of Economics, University of Maryland LUCIO SCANDIZZO Professor of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata'ANDREI SHLEIFER Professor of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachussetts GIOVANNI SOMOGYI Professor of Industrial Economics, University of Rome La Spaienza' SALVATORE ZECCHINI Deputy Secretary General, OECD, Paris, Director of CCET.

Inhalt
Notes on the Contributors Governance and New Institutional Economics: Some Introductory Remarks; Luigi Paganetto Why Poor Economic Policies must Promote Corruption: Lessons from the East for all Countries; Mancur Olson Inflation, Central Bank Independence, Labour and Financial Governance: Some Evidence from OECD Countries; Michele Bagella & Leonardo Becchetti Rules, Institutions and Crime: An Economist's Point of View; Fabio Gobbo Regulation of Capital Flows and Exchange Rate Volatility: Preliminary Results on the Italian Experience; Andrea Berardi, Alberto Dalmazzo & Giancarlo Marini Transaction Cost Politics and Economic Policy: A Framework and a Case-Study; Avinash Dixit An Economic Analysis of Proposals for Constitutional Fiscal Constraints; Giovanni Somogyi The Governance of a Globalising World Economy; Salvatore Zecchini Two Approaches to Economic Governance; Bruno Jossa Wage Control and Economic Performance; Carlo Dell'Aringa Origins of Bac Policies: Control, Corruption and Confusion; Andrei Shleifer Economic Theory and Institutions: An Introductory Note; Giovanni Caravale Conclusions; Edmund S.Phelps Index