Venture capital contracts define the rules of the investment for the venture capitalist and the portfolio company. They therefore have the potential to impact the success of the business and the venture capitalist's return. For this reason, contracts have recently attracted great research interest.

Karoline Jung-Senssfelder presents the first augmented contracting analysis, focusing on the interaction of both, financial instruments and covenants, in the creation of incentives to the contracting parties. With a focus on the German market, she integrates the findings of her model-based theoretical and survey-based empirical analyses to derive value-adding implications for an incentive-compatible contract design in the German venture capital market.

Autorentext
Dr. Karoline Jung-Senssfelder promovierte am Stiftungslehrstuhl Unternehmensfinanzierung und Kapitalmärkte der European Business School, Oestrich-Winkel.

Inhalt
Venture Capital and Contracting.- Review of Academic Literature.- Contract Design Approach to Cash Flow Incentive Mechanisms.- Empirical Evidence on Contractual Architecture.- Synthesis.- Conclusion.