The theory of practical rationality does not belong to one academic discipline alone. There are quite divergent philosophical, economical, sociological, psychological and politological contributions. Sometimes the disciplinary boundaries impede theoretical progress. On the other hand it is an indication for the high complexity of the subject that so many divergent paradigms compete with one another, or - what is worse - live separately in a kind of splendid isolation. Decision theory in the broader sense, embracing the theory of games and collective choice theory, can help to understand practical reason in philosophical analysis. But there are interesting aspects which cannot be dealt with adequately within a decision-theoretic conceptual framework. To have both of these convictions justifies to neglect dis ciplinary boundaries and poses a problem for the orthodoxies of either sides. All the essays of this volume focus on the relation between economic rationality and practical reason and discuss different aspects of the same problem, i. e. a basic deficiency in the standard economic theory of practical rationality. But philosophical analysis would not be of much help if it just rejected the economic paradigm. It must rather help to integrate economic aspects into a broader view on practical reason.

Autorentext
Julian Nida-Rümelin studierte Philosophie, Physik, Mathematik und Politikwissenschaft in München und Tübingen, lehrte Philosophie und politische Theorie in München, Minneapolis, Tübingen, Brügge, Göttingen und Berlin (1993-2003 o. Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Göttingen, seit 2004 Ordinarius für politische Theorie und Philosophie an der Universität München) und war Kulturstaatsminister im ersten Kabinett Schröder.

Klappentext

This book aims at giving a clear account of the central characteristics and problems of the orthodox notion of consequentialist economic rationality and at showing how the formal core of classical decision theory can be defended against objections and incorporated into a coherentist notion of practical reason. The `orthodox' paradigm of economic rationality is shown to be defective in several respects. The author maintains that there are many situations in which an agent makes a decision which a theory of rationality should be able to reconstruct as rational, but in which a reconstruction in terms of the standard consequentialist interpretation of economic rationality seems to be inadequate. The core of the classical theory of economic rationality is coherentist and does not necessarily call for a consequentialist interpretation. Therefore, the formal coherence axioms are compatible with a theory of practical rationality which accounts for good reasons for actions which cannot be incorporated into the consequentialist account of economic rationality.

Inhalt

1. Rationality and Morality.- 2. Rational Choice: Extensions and Revisions.- 3. Actions and Intentions.- 4. Bayesian Consequentialism.- 5. Formal Economic Rationality.- 6. Non-consequentialist Economic Rationality.- 7. Interpersonal Dependency of Preferences.- 8. Practical Reason and Metapreferences.- 9. The Plurality of Good Reasons.- 10. Structural Rationality and Coherentism.