Executive Decree Authority

This book offers a theory that predicts when executives should turn to decree and when legislatures should accept this method of policy-making.

Autorentext
John M. Carey is John Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences at Dartmouth College. He has also taught at the Universidad Católica de Chile, the University of Rochester, Washington University in St Louis, Harvard University, and at the Fundación Juan March in Madrid, Spain. His interests are comparative politics, elections, and Latin American politics. His research focuses on institutional design and democratic representation. Carey's books include Legislative Voting and Accountability (Cambridge University Press), Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (with Matthew Shugart, Cambridge University Press), Term Limits in the State Legislatures (with Richard Niemi and Lynda Powell, University of Michigan Press), and Term Limits and Legislative Representation (Cambridge University Press). He has published articles in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, Perspectives on Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Electoral Studies, Party Politics, Comparative Politics, Latin American Politics and Society, Public Choice, Estudios Publicos, Political y Gobierno, the Revista de Ciencias Politicas, and the Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, as well as chapters in twenty edited volumes. Data and results from his research are available on his website (http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jcarey/).

Klappentext

When presidents or prime ministers make law by decree, are we witnessing the usurpation of legislative authority The increased frequency of policy-making by decree, in older democracies as well as in the newer regimes of Latin America and the post-communist world, has generated concern that legislatures are being marginalized and thus that democratic institutions are not functioning. Professors Carey and Shugart suggest which elements of constitutional design should (and should not) foster reliance on decree authority. Individual chapters then bring the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, France, Italy, Peru, Russia, the United States, and Venezuela to bear on the theory. The book combines broadly comparative analysis with intensive case studies to provide a more thorough understanding of the scope of executive authority across countries.

Zusammenfassung
Across political systems, executives increasingly take (or are given) the authority to act without concurrent legislative action. This book offers a theory of political institutions that predicts when executives should turn to decree and when legislatures should accept - or even prefer - this method of making policy.

Inhalt

1. Calling out the tanks or filling out the forms? John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart; 2. When the president governs alone: the decretazo in Argentina 1989-93 Delia Ferreira Rubio and Matteo Goretti; 3. Presidential decree authority in Russia, 1991-5 Scott Parrish; 4. Presidential usurpation or congressional preference?: the evolution of executive decree authority in Peru Gregory Schmidt; 5. Presidential decree authority in Venezuela Brian F. Crisp; 6. Dancing without a lead: legislative decrees in Italy Vincent Della Sala and Amie Kreppel; 7. The pen is mightier than the congress: Presidential decree power in Brazil Timothy J. Power; 8. Executive decree authority in France John D. Huber; 9. In search of the administrative President: Presidential 'decree' powers and policy implementation in the United States Brian R. Sala; 10. Institutional design and executive decree John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart; Appendix; References.