Autorentext
Johan A. Lybeck is CEO of Finanskonsult AB. As an academic, he has been, inter alia, a Chaired Professor of Economics, an Associate Research Professor of Econometrics and an Adjunct Professor of Finance. His banking career includes positions as Senior Vice President of Swedbank (Stockholm) in charge of financial strategy and Chief Economist at Matteus Bank. He is the author of A Global History of the Financial Crash of 20072010 (Cambridge, 2011).

Klappentext

A number of changes have been made to the supervision and regulation of banks as a result of the recent financial meltdown. Some are for the better, such as the Basel III rules for increasing the quality and quantity of capital in banks, but legal changes on both sides of the Atlantic now make it much more difficult to resolve failing banks by means of taxpayer funded bail-outs and could hinder bank resolution in future financial crises. In this book, Johan A. Lybeck uses case studies from Europe and the United States to examine and grade a number of bank resolutions in the last financial crisis and establish which were successful, which failed, and why. Using in-depth analysis of recent legislation, he explains how a bank resolution can be successful, and emphasizes the need for taxpayer-funded bail-outs to create a viable banking system that will promote economic and financial stability.

Zusammenfassung
Johan A. Lybeck uses European and American case studies to review thirty bank resolutions from the last financial crisis and to outline the requirements for successful bank resolutions in the future. Via in-depth analysis of recent legislation, he emphasizes the need for taxpayer-funded bail-outs to create a viable banking system.

Inhalt

Acknowledgements; List of abbreviations; Introduction; Part I. A Chronological Presentation of Crisis Events January 2007-December 2014; Part II. Bail-Out and/or Bail-In of Banks in Europe - A Country-by-Country Event Study on Those European Countries Which Did Not Receive Outside Support: 1. United Kingdom: Northern Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Lloyds Banking Group; 2. Germany: IKB, Hypo Real Estate, Commerzbank, Landesbanken; 3. Belgium, France, Luxembourg: Dexia; 4. Benelux: Fortis, ING, SNS Reaal; 5. Italy: Monte dei Paschi de Siena; 6. Denmark: Roskilde Bank, Fionia Bank and the others vs Amagerbanken and Fjordbank Mors; Part III. Bail-Out and/or Bail-In of Banks in Europe - A Country-by-Country Event Study on Those European Countries Which Received IMF/EU Support: 7. Iceland: Landsbanki, Glitnir and Kaupthing; 8. Ireland: Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Banks; 9. Greece: Emporiki, Eurobank, Agricultural Bank; 10. Portugal: Caixa Geral, Banco Espirito Santo, Millennium Bank; 11. Spain: Bankia and the other ex-cajas; 12. Cyprus: Bank of Cyprus, Popular Bank (Laiki); Part IV. The Tarp Program and the Bailing Out (and Bailing In) of US Banks: 13. The roles of the FDIC, the Treasury and the Fed in the crisis; 14. USA: Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers; 15. USA: Countrywide, IndyMac, Washington Mutual and Wachovia; 16. USA: AIG, Citibank and Bank of America: zombies too big to fail?; Part V. Summary of the Micro Studies; Part VI. Political and Regulatory Responses to the Crisis - To Bail Out or To Bail In, That's the Question: 17. Future bail-outs in the United States under Dodd-Frank and OLA; 18. Future bail-outs in the European Union under the Single Resolution Mechanism and the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive; Conclusion: towards host-country supervision and resolution?; Addendum; Bibliography; Index.