Autorentext

Jan Dejnozka is a visiting scholar of Law and Philosophy at the University of Michigan. His articles have appeared in Russell, International Studies in Philosophy, Dialogos and The International Journal for Philosophy.

Klappentext

The analytic movement advertised its 'linguistic turn' as a radical break from the two-thousand-year-old substance tradition. But this is an illusion. On the fundamental level of ontology, there is enough reformulation and presupposition of traditional 'no entity without identity' themes to analogize Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine to Aristotle as paradigmatic of modified realism. Thus the pace of ontology is glacial. Frege and Russell, not Wittgenstein and Quine, emerge as the true analytic progenitors of 'no entity without identity,' offering between them at least twenty-nine private language arguments and sixty-four 'no entity without identity' theories.

Zusammenfassung
This text examines how the thought of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and Quine bear on the fundamental questions of 20th-century philosophy. It argues that there is a general form of ontology, modified realism, that they share not only with each other, but with most major Western philosophers.