This textbook, now published in its second edition, offers a comprehensive and accessible introduction to game theory, with balanced coverage of both noncooperative and cooperative approaches to strategic decision-making. The noncooperative chapters examine advanced topics such as perfect and proper equilibria, evolutionary stable strategies, and correlated equilibrium, alongside subjects that are often underrepresented in comparable textbooks.

The cooperative game theory sections address core topics including coalitional games, cake-cutting and fairness, cooperative bargaining, and matching theory. In addition, the book features a dedicated chapter on implementation theory, linking theoretical foundations to modern applications in economic design.

Designed for one-semester advanced undergraduate or graduate-level courses, the book clearly distinguishes itself from other texts at the same level. Each chapter opens with precise theoretical definitions and proceeds with carefully worked-out examples. Selected chapters include formal propositions that either establish the existence of equilibrium in abstract settings or clarify relationships between key game-theoretic concepts.

While rigorous in scope, the book assumes no advanced background in calculus or algebra. The mathematical exposition is deliberately kept clear, self-contained, and accessible, enabling readers to engage confidently with proofs and apply theoretical ideas to practical examples.

This revised and extended second edition substantially broadens the foundations and applications of Mastering Game Theory . It introduces a stronger epistemic framework, enriches the treatment of equilibrium concepts, expands the analysis of correlated equilibrium, and incorporates well-known examples of auctions, implementation, voting, and matching markets. With approximately 90 pages of new material and 20 additional figures, the second edition enhances the book's coherence, depth, and relevance for advanced students and early-career researchers.

A companion workbook is also available, offering a rich collection of exercises and fully worked solutions ranging from basic applications to challenging mathematical problems.

Provides a thorough introduction to game theory Designed for use in advanced undergraduate or graduate-level courses in economics and related fields A companion workbook featuring a variety of exercises and solutions is also available

Autorentext

Ismail Saglam earned his BSc in Electrical Engineering and his MA and PhD in Economics from Bilkent University. He is currently a Professor of Economics at TOBB University of Economics and Technology (TOBB ETU) in Ankara, Turkey. His research spans a broad range of topics, including applied game theory, axiomatic bargaining, matching theory, mechanism design, monetary general equilibrium, noncooperative game theory, noncooperative game theory, oligopoly, and regulation.

Inhalt

Introduction to Strategic Form Games.- Dominance.- Rationalizability.- Nash Equilibrium.- Perfect Equilibrium.- Evolutionary Stable Strategies.- Correlated Equilibrium.- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.- Introduction to Extensive Form Games.- Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.- Sequential Equilibrium.- Repeated Games.- Implementation of Social Choice Rules.- Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility.- Cake Cutting and Fairness.- Cooperative Bargaining.- Matching Markets.