This volume argues that theistic philosophy should be seen not as an armchair enterprise but rather as a critical endeavor to bring philosophy of religion into close contact with emerging sciences of religion. This text engages with the rationality of religious belief by investigating central problems and arguments in philosophy of religion from the perspective of new naturalistic research. A central question the book analyzes is whether findings in cognitive science of religion ** (CSR) falsify or undermine religious ideas and beliefs.

With regard to CSR, this volume offers a sustained and critical investigation of the neutrality and positive-relevance view, before offering a re-appraisal of the conflict view. The text argues that when scrutinizing these views, much more attention must be paid to specific normative premises that allow empirical findings to have epistemic relevance. A novel feature is the theoretical application of analytical epistemology in virtue-epistemology to the central question of whether CSR undermines, supports, or is neutral with respect to religious belief. This book appeals to upper-level students and researchers in the field.

Uniquely criticizes neutrality-views of cognitive science of religion (CSR) and its impact on the rationality of religious belief Brings together new research on cognitive biases, cultural evolution, in-group/out-group bias, and the psychology of religious-belief-formation Relates research to central issues in the philosophy of religion Places the current debates on evolution into the perspective of virtue-epistemology

Autorentext
Halvor Kvandal holds a PhD in philosophy from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). He currently works at Queen Maud University College of Early Childhood Education, Norway. Kvandal's research interests focus on the intersection between naturalistic theories of religion and the philosophy of religion, especially epistemology.

Klappentext

This volume argues that theistic philosophy should be seen not as an armchair enterprise but rather as a critical endeavor to bring philosophy of religion into close contact with emerging sciences of religion. This text engages with the rationality of religious belief by investigating central problems and arguments in philosophy of religion from the perspective of new naturalistic research. A central question the book analyzes is whether findings in cognitive science of religion (CSR) falsify or undermine religious ideas and beliefs. With regard to CSR, this volume offers a sustained and critical investigation of the neutrality and positive-relevance view, before offering a re-appraisal of the conflict view. The text argues that when scrutinizing these views, much more attention must be paid to specific normative premises that allow empirical findings to have epistemic relevance. A novel feature is the theoretical application of analytical epistemology in virtue-epistemology to the central question of whether CSR undermines, supports, or is neutral with respect to religious belief. This book appeals to upper-level students and researchers in the field.

Inhalt
Chapter 1. When Cognitive Science enters the Science and Religion Debate.- Chapter 2. The Ultimate Origin of Religion.- Chapter 3. The Proximate Origin of Religion.- Chapter 4. Theistic Evidentialism and the Cognitive Science of Morality.- Chapter 5. Do We Have A God-Faculty? A New Appraisal of Reformed Epistemology.- Chapter 6. A Virtue Epistemology for the Theistic Disposition.- Chapter 7. Troubled Navigation: Evaluating the Theistic Disposition.- Chapter 8. Cognitive Science And Theist Religion: An Unhappy Marriage?.