This major new study returns to Aristotle in order to examine the salient categories in terms of which we think about ourselves and our nature. An overview of the concepts of substance, causation, power and agency provides the background for an investigation into teleology, rationality and explanations of behaviour in terms of reasons.

Informationen zum Autor P. M. S. Hacker is the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. He is author of the four-volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations , the first two volumes co-authored with G. P. Baker (Blackwell, 1980-96) and of Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell, 1996). He has also written extensively on philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, most recently Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003) and History of Cognitive Neuroscience (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), both co-authored with M. R. Bennett. He is also co-editor (with Joachim Schulte) and co-translator of the 4th edition of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). Klappentext This major study examines the most fundamental categories in terms of which we conceive of ourselves, critically surveying the concepts of substance, causation, agency, teleology, rationality, mind, body and person, and elaborating the conceptual fields in which they are embedded. The culmination of 40 years of thought on the philosophy of mind and the nature of the mankind Written by one of the world's leading philosophers, the co-author of the monumental 4 volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell Publishing, 1980-2004) Uses broad categories, such as substance, causation, agency and power to examine how we think about ourselves and our nature Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of human nature are sketched and contrasted* Individual chapters clarify and provide an historical overview of a specific concept, then link the concept to ideas contained in other chapters Zusammenfassung This major new study returns to Aristotle in order to examine the salient categories in terms of which we think about ourselves and our nature. An overview of the concepts of substance, causation, power and agency provides the background for an investigation into teleology, rationality and explanations of behaviour in terms of reasons. Inhaltsverzeichnis Preface xi Chapter 1 The Project 1 1. Human nature 1 2. Philosophical anthropology 4 3. Grammatical investigation 7 4. Philosophical investigation 11 5. Philosophy and 'mere words' 14 6. A challenge to the autonomy of the philosophical enterprise: Quine 17 7. The Platonic and Aristotelian traditions in philosophical anthropology 21 Chapter 2 Substance 29 1. Substances: things 29 2. Substances: stuffs 34 3. Substance-referring expressions 37 4. Conceptual connections between things and stuffs 42 5. Substances and their substantial parts 44 6. Substances conceived as natural kinds 45 7. Substances conceived as a common logico-linguistic category 49 8. A historical digression: misconceptions of the category of substance 51 Chapter 3 Causation 57 1. Causation: Humean, neo-Humean and anti-Humean 57 2. On causal necessity 62 3. Event causation is not a prototype 65 4. The inadequacy of Hume's analysis: observability, spatio-temporal relations and regularity 69 5. The flaw in the early modern debate 73 6. Agent causation as prototype 75 7. Agent causation is only a prototype 80 8. Event causation and other centres of variation 82 9. Overview 88 Chapter 4 Powers 90 1. Possibility 90 2. Powers of the inanimate 93 3. Active and passive powers of the inanimate 96 4. Power and its actualization 98 5. Power and its vehicle 103 6. First- and second-order powers; loss of power 105 7. Human powers: basic distinctions 106 8. Human powers: further distinctions 114 9. Dispositions 118 Chapter 5 Agency 122 1. Inanimate agents...

Autorentext

P. M. S. Hacker is the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. He is author of the four-volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, the first two volumes co-authored with G. P. Baker (Blackwell, 1980-96) and of Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell, 1996). He has also written extensively on philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, most recently Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003) and History of Cognitive Neuroscience (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), both co-authored with M. R. Bennett. He is also co-editor (with Joachim Schulte) and co-translator of the 4th edition of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

Klappentext

This major study examines the most fundamental categories in terms of which we conceive of ourselves, critically surveying the concepts of substance, causation, agency, teleology, rationality, mind, body and person, and elaborating the conceptual fields in which they are embedded. The culmination of 40 years of thought on the philosophy of mind and the nature of the mankind Written by one of the world's leading philosophers, the co-author of the monumental 4 volume Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell Publishing, 1980-2004) Uses broad categories, such as substance, causation, agency and power to examine how we think about ourselves and our nature Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of human nature are sketched and contrasted * Individual chapters clarify and provide an historical overview of a specific concept, then link the concept to ideas contained in other chapters

Inhalt

Preface xi

Chapter 1 The Project 1

1. Human nature 1

2. Philosophical anthropology 4

3. Grammatical investigation 7

4. Philosophical investigation 11

5. Philosophy and 'mere words' 14

6. A challenge to the autonomy of the philosophical enterprise: Quine 17

7. The Platonic and Aristotelian traditions in philosophical anthropology 21

   Chapter 2 Substance 29

8. Substances: things 29

9. Substances: stuffs 34

10. Substance-referring expressions 37

11. Conceptual connections between things and stuffs 42

12. Substances and their substantial parts 44

13. Substances conceived as natural kinds 45

14. Substances conceived as a common logico-linguistic category 49

15. A historical digression: misconceptions of the category of substance 51

    Chapter 3 Causation 57

16. Causation: Humean, neo-Humean and anti-Humean 57

17. On causal necessity 62

18. Event causation is not a prototype 65

19. The inadequacy of Hume's analysis: observability, spatio-temporal relations and regularity 69

20. The flaw in the early modern debate 73

21. Agent causation as prototype 75

22. Agent causation is only a prototype 80

23. Event causation and other centres of variation 82

24. Overview 88

    Chapter 4 Powers 90

25. Possibility 90

26. Powers of the inanimate 93

27. Active and passive powers of the inanimate 96

28. Power and its actualization 98

29. Power and its vehicle 103

30. First- and second-order powers; loss of power 105

31. Human powers: basic distinctions 106

32. Human powers: further distinctions 114

33. Dispositions 118

    Chapter 5 Agency 122

34. Inanimate agents 122

35. Inanimate needs 128

36. Animate agents: needs and wants 130

37. Volitional agency: preliminaries 137

38. Doings, acts and actions 140

39. Human agency and action 144

40. A historical overview 146

41. Human action as agential causation of movement 153

    Chapter 6 Teleology and Teleological Explanation 161

42. Teleology and purpose 161

43. What things have a purpose? 169

44. Purpose and axiology 175

45. The beneficial 180

46. A historical digression: teleology and causality 181

    Chapter 7 Reasons and Explanation of Human Action 199

47. Rationality and reasonableness 199

48. Reason, reasoning and reasons 203

49. Explaining human behaviour 210…