Inspired by the experience of some advanced economies, a number of emerging market economies have recently adopted rules limiting the budget deficit, expenditure level, or indebtedness of the public sector, while others consider them for eventual adoption. This volume brings together policy analysts to discuss the rationale, suitability, and usefulness of fiscal policy rules in emerging market economies. Grouped under three main parts (political economy and macroeconomic setting; design issues at the national level; design issues at the subnational level), the chapters have a practical orientation, based on conceptual grounding.

Autorentext
FABRIZIO BALASSONE Bank of Italy, Italy OLAV BJERKHOLT University of Oslo, Norway MIGUEL BRAUN University of San Andres, Colombia MARCO BUTI European Commission, International ANDRÉS CONESA Secretariat of Finance, Mexico FABRIZIO CORICELLI University of Siena, Italy ALLAN DRAZEN Tel Aviv University, Israel VALERIO ERCOLANI University of Siena, Italy DANIELE FRANCO Bank of Italy, Italy GABRIELE GIUDICE European Commission, Italy ILAN GOLDFAJN Central Bank of Brazil, Brazil CHRISTIAN Y. GONZALEZ Georgetown University, USA EDUARDO R. GUARDIA State of Sao Paulo, Brazil RICARDO HAUSMANN Harvard University, USA KALPANA KOCHHAR International Monetary Fund, USA IRENE NICULESCU Central University of Venezuela and Ministry of Finance, Venezuela GUILLERMO PERRY The World Bank, USA CATRIONA PURFIELD International Monetary Fund, USA DAVID ROSENBLATT The World Bank, USA ALLEN SCHICK Brookings Institution and University of Maryland, USA MOISÉS J. SCHWARTZ Secretariat of Finance, Mexico ALEJANDRO SOMUANO Secretariat of Finance, Mexico J. ALFREDO TIJERINA Secretariat of Finance, Mexico MARIANO TOMMASI University of San Andres, Colombia STEVEN B. WEBB The World Bank, USA STEFANIA ZOTTERI Bank of Italy, Italy

Inhalt
Overview of Fiscal Policy Rules in Emerging Markets; G.Kopits PART I: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MACROECONOMIC SETTING Fiscal Rules from a Political Economy Perspective; A.Drazen Good Debt Ratios, Bad Credit Ratings: The Role of Debt Structure; R.Hausmann Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility?; G.Perry Fiscal Policy and High Capital Mobility; G.Kopits Fiscal Institutions Versus Political Will; A.Schick PART II: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL EMU Fiscal Rules: What Can and Cannot Be Exported; M.Buti & G.Giudice Fiscal Rules and Debt Sustainability in Brazil; I.Goldfajn & E.R.Guardia Fiscal Rules in Mexico: Evolution and Prospects; A.Conesa , M.J.Schwartz , A.Somuano & J.A.Tijerina Fiscal Rules on the Road to an Enlarged European Union; F.Coricelli & V.Ercolani Fiscal Rules for Economies with Nonrenewable Resources: Norway and Venezuela; O.Bjerkholt & I.Niculescu PART III: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL Subnational Fiscal Rules: A Game Theoretic Approach; M.Braun & M.Tommasi Rules-Based Adjustment in a Highly Decentralized Context: The Case of India; K.Kochhar & C.Purfield Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Lessons from the EMU; F.Balassone, D.Franco & S.Zotteri Rules for Stabilizing Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America; C.Y.Gonzalez, D.Rosenblat t & S.B.Webb