Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (§ 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. The hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings, which was developed using a decision model, is experimentally confirmed. Moreover, the author analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.

Publication in the field of economic sciences Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Autorentext

Frederik Drescher holds a degree in Business Administration from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management and wrote his doctoral thesis at Technische Universität München under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Gunther Friedl. He is a consultant with a special focus on corporate restructuring.

Inhalt
InInsolvency Timing as an Agency Problem.- Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing.- Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision.- Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments.