The volume offers a lively and wide-ranging debate on the major questions of perceptual epistemology, including how perceptual experiences can bestow positive epistemic standing to empirical judgments and beliefs; the relative epistemic import of veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences; the relation between experience and knowledge; and the nature of experience in view of its epistemic linkages to discursive contents.

The volume is centered around five cutting-edge essays by leading authors in these areasAnil Gupta, Andrea Kern, Christopher Peacocke, Susanna Schellenberg and Crispin Wrightalong with no less than thirty contributions scrutinizing and critically discussing the essays, prompting detailed rejoinders from the lead authors. The volume closes with an extensive debate between Annalisa Coliva, Gupta and Wright. Taken as a whole, the volume covers much ground in epistemology of perception and displays a variety of approaches and perspectives through fruitful and accessible exchanges. It will be of interest not only to researchers working in perceptual epistemology but also to students new to the subject.

Presents cutting-edge research on the role of experience in cognition Top researchers presenting rival views on the relationship between experience and empirical rationality Lead contributions accompanied by detailed expert criticisms and comments, with author responses

Autorentext

Milo Vuleti is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Belgrade. He has received his PhD from the University of Pittsburgh and specializes in the philosophy of perception and epistemology.
Ori Beck is a philosophy lecturer at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Before coming to Ben-Gurion, he was a junior research fellow at Christ's College, Cambridge and received his Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. He specializes in the philosophy of perception (including philosophy of cognitive science), philosophy of mind, and epistemology.

Inhalt
Part 1: Chapter 1. An Exposition of Reformed Empiricism.- Chapter 2. Discussion of Gupta's An Exposition of Reformed Empiricism.- Part 2: Chapter 3. "Perceiving that p" - Capacities, Opportunities and Hindrances.- Chapter 4. Discussion of Kern's 'Perceiving that p' - Capacities, Opportunities and Hindrances.- Part 3: Chapter 5.- Chapter 6. Discussion of Peacocke's.- Part 4: Chapter 7. Capacities First: Epistemic Externalism without Epistemic Disjunctivism.- Chapter 8. Discussion of Susanna Schellenberg's Capacities First: Epistemic Externalism without Epistemic Disjunctivism. Part 5: Chapter 9. Two Conceptions of Perceptual Justification: Do their Differences matter?.- Chapter 10. Discussion of Wright's Two Conceptions of Perceptual Justification: Do their Differences matter?.