Informationen zum Autor Eitan Shamir is a Research Fellow at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, Israeli Defense Forces, and teaches in the Security Studies program at Tel Aviv University. His military experience includes service in the IDF's paratroops brigade and as a reserve officer in the IDF's Organizational Psychology Unit. Klappentext On today's complex, fragmented, fast-moving battlefield, where combatants adapt constantly to exploit one-another's weaknesses, there is a demonstrable requirement for military commanders to devolve a high level of autonomy of decision-making and action to leaders on the ground. An effective model for doing this has existed for some time in the form of mission command and has been utilized by the U.S., Israeli, and British Armies-but with mixed success. This book examines in depth the experiences of the armed forces of each of these countries in implementing mission command, and reveals the key factors that have determined the success or failure of the implementation-factors such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the spread of low-intensity conflicts and operations other than war, and differences in how military cultures interpret, articulate, and exercise the command function. It has significant implications for both the development of military doctrine and the training and education of tomorrow's military leaders. Zusammenfassung The book tells the story of the theory and history of the mission command approach (decentralized command) and the attempts by different armies to adopt and reform according to this approach.

"This book clearly illustrates the important role that Mission Command plays in effective military operations. [The] comparison of the United States, British, and Israeli Armies in adopting Mission Command and [the] observations on their cultural differences were compelling."

Autorentext
Eitan Shamir is a Research Fellow at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, Israeli Defense Forces, and teaches in the Security Studies program at Tel Aviv University. His military experience includes service in the IDF's paratroops brigade and as a reserve officer in the IDF's Organizational Psychology Unit.

Klappentext

On today's complex, fragmented, fast-moving battlefield, where combatants adapt constantly to exploit one-another's weaknesses, there is a demonstrable requirement for military commanders to devolve a high level of autonomy of decision-making and action to leaders on the ground. An effective model for doing this has existed for some time in the form of mission command and has been utilized by the U.S., Israeli, and British Armies-but with mixed success.

This book examines in depth the experiences of the armed forces of each of these countries in implementing mission command, and reveals the key factors that have determined the success or failure of the implementation-factors such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the spread of low-intensity conflicts and operations other than war, and differences in how military cultures interpret, articulate, and exercise the command function. It has significant implications for both the development of military doctrine and the training and education of tomorrow's military leaders.

Zusammenfassung
The book tells the story of the theory and history of the mission command approach (decentralized command) and the attempts by different armies to adopt and reform according to this approach.