Personnel Economics in Practice

Klappentext Personnel Economics in Practice, 3rd Edition by Edward Lazear and Michael Gibbs gives readers a rigorous framework for understanding organizational design and the management of employees. Economics has proven to be a powerful approach in the changing study of organizations and human resources by adding rigor and structure and clarifying many important issues. Not only will readers learn and apply ideas from microeconomics, they will also learn principles that will be valuable in their future careers. Zusammenfassung Personnel Economics in Practice! 3rd Edition by Edward Lazear and Michael Gibbs gives readers a rigorous framework for understanding organizational design and the management of employees. Economics has proven to be a powerful approach in the changing study of organizations and human resources by adding rigor and structure and clarifying many important issues. Not only will readers learn and apply ideas from microeconomics! they will also learn principles that will be valuable in their future careers. Inhaltsverzeichnis ABOUT THE AUTHORS PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS PART ONE SORTING AND INVESTING IN EMPLOYEES CHAPTER 1 SETTING HIRING STANDARDS An Example: Hiring Risky Workers New Hires as Options Analysis A Counterargument Setting Hiring Standards Balancing Benefits Against Costs Foreign Competition The Method of Production How Many Workers to Hire? Other Factors Making Decisions with Imperfect Information Make a Decision Independent of Analysis Estimate the Relevant Information Experiment Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 2 RECRUITMENT Introduction Screening Job Applicants Credentials Learning a Worker's Productivity Is Screening Profitable? For Whom? Probation Signaling Who Pays, and Who Benefits? Examples Signaling More Formally: Separating and Pooling Equilibria Which Type of Firm is More Likely to use Signaling? Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT IN SKILLS Introduction Matching Investments in Education Effects of Costs and Benefits Was Benjamin Franklin Correct? Investments in On the Job Training General vs. Firm-Specific Human Capital Who Should Pay for Training? Implications of On the Job Training Rent Sharing and Compensation Implicit Contracting Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) CHAPTER 4 MANAGING TURNOVER Introduction Is Turnover Good or Bad? Importance of Sorting Technical Change Organizational Change Hierarchical Structure Specific Human Capital Retention Strategies Reducing Costs of Losing Key Employees Embracing Turnover Bidding for Employees Raiding Other Firms: Benefits and Pitfalls Offer Matching Layoffs and Buyouts Who to Target for Layoffs Buyouts Summary Study Questions References Further Reading Appendix (available online) PART TWO ORGANIZATIONAL AND JOB DESIGN CHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKING Introduction The Organization of an Economy Markets as Information Systems Markets as Incentive Systems Markets and ...

Klappentext

Personnel Economics in Practice, 3rd Edition by Edward Lazear and Michael Gibbs gives readers a rigorous framework for understanding organizational design and the management of employees. Economics has proven to be a powerful approach in the changing study of organizations and human resources by adding rigor and structure and clarifying many important issues. Not only will readers learn and apply ideas from microeconomics, they will also learn principles that will be valuable in their future careers.

Inhalt

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

PREFACE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

PART ONE SORTING AND INVESTING IN EMPLOYEES

CHAPTER 1 SETTING HIRING STANDARDS

An Example: Hiring Risky Workers

New Hires as Options

Analysis

A Counterargument

Setting Hiring Standards

Balancing Benefits Against Costs

Foreign Competition

The Method of Production

How Many Workers to Hire?

Other Factors

Making Decisions with Imperfect Information

Make a Decision Independent of Analysis

Estimate the Relevant Information

Experiment

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

**CHAPTER 2 RECRUITMENT
**
Introduction

Screening Job Applicants

Credentials

Learning a Worker's Productivity

Is Screening Profitable? For Whom?

Probation

Signaling

Who Pays, and Who Benefits?

Examples

Signaling More Formally: Separating and Pooling Equilibria

Which Type of Firm is More Likely to use Signaling?

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

**CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT IN SKILLS
**
Introduction

Matching

Investments in Education

Effects of Costs and Benefits

Was Benjamin Franklin Correct?

Investments in On the Job Training

General vs. Firm-Specific Human Capital

Who Should Pay for Training?

Implications of On the Job Training

Rent Sharing and Compensation

Implicit Contracting

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

**CHAPTER 4 MANAGING TURNOVER
**
Introduction

Is Turnover Good or Bad?

Importance of Sorting

Technical Change

Organizational Change

Hierarchical Structure

Specific Human Capital

Retention Strategies

Reducing Costs of Losing Key Employees

Embracing Turnover

Bidding for Employees

Raiding Other Firms: Benefits and Pitfalls

Offer Matching

Layoffs and Buyouts

Who to Target for Layoffs

Buyouts

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

**PART TWO ORGANIZATIONAL AND JOB DESIGN

CHAPTER 5 DECISION MAKING
**
Introduction

The Organization of an Economy

Markets as Information Systems

Markets as Incentive Systems

Markets and Innovation

Benefits of Central Planning

The Market as Metaphor for Organizational Design

Benefits of Centralization

Economies of Scale or Public Goods

Better Use of Central Knowledge

Coordination

Benefits of Decentralization

Specific vs. General Knowledge

Other Benefits of Decentralization

Authority and Responsibility

Decision Making as a Multistage Process

Flat vs. Hierarchical Structures

Investing in Better Quality Decision Making

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

**CHAPTER 6 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
**
Introduction

Types of Organizational Structures

Hierarchy

Functional Structure

Divisional Structure

Matrix or Project Structure

Network Structure

Which Structure Should a Firm Use?

Coordination

Two Types of Coordination Problems

Coordination Mechanisms

Implementation

Span of Control and Number of Levels in a Hierarchy

Skills, Pay, and Structure

Evolution of a Firm's Structure

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

**CHAPTER 7 JOB DESIGN
**
Introduction

Patterns of Job Design

Optimal Job Design: Skills, Tasks, and Decisions

Multiskilling and Multitasking

Decisions

Complementarity and Job Design

When to Use Different Job Designs

Taylorism

Factors Pushing Toward Taylorism or Continuous Improvement

Intrinsic Motivation

Summary

Study Questions

References

Further Reading

Appendix (available online)

**CHAPTER 8 ADVANCED JOB DESIGN
**
Introduction

Teams

Group Decision Making

Free Rider Effects

When to Use Teams

Other Benefits of Team Pr…