This book charts the course of monetary policy in the UK from 1967 to 1982. It shows how events such as the 1967 devaluation, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the stagflation of the 1970s, and the IMF loan of 1976 all shaped policy. It shows that the 'monetarist' experiment of the 1980s was based on a fundamental misreading of 1970s monetary policy.

Autorentext
Duncan Needham is Research Fellow at Darwin College, Cambridge and Associate Director of the Centre for Financial History at Newnham College, Cambridge where he works on contemporary UK economic history. Before returning to academia, he worked as a credit trader at JP Morgan and then as a structured credit portfolio manager at Cairn Capital. Dr Needham lectures in economic history and teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in history, economics and politics.

Inhalt

1. From Devaluation to Competition and Credit Control, 1967-71 2. Competition and Credit Control, 1971-73 3. The PSBR Takes Over, 1974-76 4. Too Many Targets, 1977-79 5. The Lady is for Turning