Autorentext

Dmytro Havrilenko writes about the meeting point between environmental knowledge and state power: the places where maps, models, and institutional routines shape what strategy can realistically do. His approach is grounded in nonfiction craft and an academic sensibility, treating operational questions as problems of evidence, incentives, and decision design rather than as tales of inevitable outcomes. He is especially interested in how organisations talk themselves into confidence, how uncertainty travels through chains of command, and how "support" functions such as forecasting become decisive when time is short.In Weather as Weapon, Forecast as Advantage, Havrilenko brings a clear editorial eye to a subject that is often split between technical meteorology and abstract strategy. He writes for readers who want concepts they can test: how to connect a forecast horizon to a decision gate, how to recognise when accuracy is the wrong standard, and why resilience sometimes matters more than precision. A subtle historical thread runs through his work: northern frontiers have long rewarded those who can read conditions quickly, while punishing those who confuse experience with certainty. That tension, between hard-won local knowledge and the limits of prediction, animates his analysis of Arctic planning today.

Klappentext

In the far north, weather does not merely disrupt plans; it rewrites them, sometimes fast enough to change what opponents think they are seeing. From early polar exploration and Cold War-era basing to today's renewed interest in Arctic access, the enduring problem has been the same: operations depend on prediction, yet the Arctic is where prediction is hardest and where error is most consequential. The result is a quiet contest over timing, access, and exposure, in which a "good enough" forecast can be a tactical edge and a confident forecast can be a trap. Weather as Weapon, Forecast as Advantage explains how Arctic weather forecasting shapes military planning beyond safety considerations. It shows why forecast uncertainty must be read through the lens of the decision it serves, the time available to adjust, and the fragility of the information chain. Moving from sensing networks and model limits to command judgement and replanning costs, the book traces how forecasts enter decision cycles for aviation, maritime routing, over-ice movement, and resupply. It also examines how adversaries can exploit dependence on prediction: targeting observations, leveraging masking conditions, and anticipating predictable mobility windows that planners treat as rare opportunities. Written for students, general readers, and analysts of strategy and security, the book provides a practical framework for linking prediction quality to planning choices, risk hedges, and operational tempo. Readers finish with a sharper sense of which kinds of forecasts matter most for which missions, how uncertainty should be communicated and stress-tested, and why the most decisive advantage is often not better weather knowledge in the abstract, but better organisational use of imperfect knowledge under competition.