The author shows how sustainable development may be organized, valued and distributed by introducing situational contracting as an interactive and contextual mode of governance. Situational contracting provides a road map for where we want to go, serving the prevailing ideology in implementing the trade between efficiency and fairness.

'A very well-thought-out, interesting and novel examination of the subject.' Eugene Nulman, University of Kent, UK

'This interdisciplinary and non-technical introduction nests economic efficiency, fairness and ecological principles in a political economy framework. 'Situational contracts' meld these principles to yield understanding of how democratic societies seek a sustainable future. Such contracts reflect both political constraints and proxy information on citizen preferences; they lead to policy outcomes which mesh concerns with efficiency, justice, and "planners' preferences". This book provides unique and valuable insights into the complex process in which environmental policy is formed.' - Robert Haveman, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

Autorentext

Dirk Wolfson served with the IMF and Dutch Treasury, and was Professor of Economics at Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands, before his election in the Senate. Upon retirement, he returned to academia. He is a member of the Dutch Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences and publishes widely on economics, the environment and political philosophy.

Inhalt

1. Introduction
   1.1. About this book
   1.2. Economic analysis and environmental policy: scope and limits
   1.3. Cost-benefit analysis: a preview
   1.4. Valuation, distribution and legitimacy
   1.5. Short cuts: cost-effectiveness, standards, multi-criteria and workable competition
   1.6. Global economic development and ecological constraints
2. Valuation
   2.1. The ' 'Coase-solution ' ' and emissions trading
   2.2. Hedonic pricing, travel cost method and averting behaviour
   2.3. Stated preferences: contingent valuation and choice experiments
   2.4. Co- valuation and externalities in production functions
   2.5. Persuasion
   2.6. Fiscal instruments for managing preference
   2.7. Innovation as externality on the supply side
   2.8. Shadow prices or regulation?
   2.9. Combining results, and sensitivity analysis
3. Distribution
   3.1. Optimal allocation and fairness in distribution
   3.2. Fiscal solutions
   3.3. Distributional weights
   3.4. Visions of justice
4. Governance
   4.1. Cost-benefit analysis revisited
   4.2. Interactive governance and information management
   4.3. Situational contracting: implementation and empirical evidence
   4.4. Situational solutions in the valuation and distribution of environmental policy
   4.5. Summary and conclusions