This book introduces the first systematic approach to the debate on the unity or fragmentation of practical reasoning and its profound implications for legal philosophy. Bringing together some of the foremost legal philosophers from the Hispanic-Latin world, the book presents a thoughtful dialogue with the Anglo-American literature, making it of interest to scholars from both cultural traditions. Although the topic is rarely discussed explicitly and systematically, it is pivotal to ongoing debates about legal normativity, the nature of law, legal authority, and the rationale behind legal decisions. This book fills this gap by providing a comprehensive perspective that illuminates the intersections between the philosophy of law and the philosophy of practical reasoning. It analyses law from the perspective of the agent and offers deep insights into critical issues in the field of law. The volume is divided into four parts. The 1st part addresses the question of the nature of reasons and the unity of practical and theoretical reasoning. The 2nd part deals with the question of whether practical reasoning works in a unified or fragmented way. The 3rd section examines the autonomy of legal normativity in relation to morality and other normative domains. In the 4th and concluding section, the authors analyse the implications of the thesis of the unity of practical reason for legal decision-making and the authority of law.

Autorentext
Diego Dei Vecchi is Lecturer at the University of Girona, Spain. Sebastián Figueroa Rubio is Ramón y Cajal Researcher at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain.Pablo Rapetti is Associate Professor at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Mexico.María Cristina Redondo is Professor of Law at the University of Genoa, Italy.

Klappentext
This open access book introduces the first systematic approach to the debate on the unity or fragmentation of practical reasoning and its profound implications for legal philosophy.

Bringing together some of the foremost legal philosophers from the Hispanic-Latin world, the book presents a thoughtful dialogue with the Anglo-American literature, making it of interest to scholars from both cultural traditions. Although the topic is rarely discussed explicitly and systematically, it is pivotal to ongoing debates about legal normativity, the nature of law, legal authority, and the rationale behind legal decisions. This book fills this gap by providing a comprehensive perspective that illuminates the intersections between the philosophy of law and the philosophy of practical reasoning. It analyses law from the perspective of the agent and offers deep insights into critical issues in the field of law.

The volume is divided into four parts.

The 1st part addresses the question of the nature of reasons and the unity of practical and theoretical reasoning. The 2nd part deals with the question of whether practical reasoning works in a unified or fragmented way. The 3rd section examines the autonomy of legal normativity in relation to morality and other normative domains. In the 4th and concluding section, the authors analyse the implications of the thesis of the unity of practical reason for legal decision-making and the authority of law.

The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

Inhalt

Introduction: Is Practical Reason Unitary or Fragmentary? And Why Should Jurisprudence Care? María Cristina Redondo (Università degli Studi di Genova, Italy), Diego Dei Vecchi (Universitat de Girona, Spain), Pablo Rapetti (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México), Sebastián Figueroa Rubio (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain)

Part 1: Kinds of Reasons and the (Dis)unity of Reasoning

1. Reasons and Propositions: An Approach to the Role of Propositions in the Unity of Practical Reason, Sebastián Agüero (Universidad Austral de Chile)

2. Normative Orders as Sets of Functions and the Unity of Practical Reasoning, Maribel Narváez Mora (Universitat de Girona, Spain)

   Part 2: Practical Reason and the Unity vs Fragmentation Problem

3. The Fragmentation of Practical Reason in the History of Ideas, Pau Luque (Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Mexico)
4. The Dogma Of The Unity of Practical Reasoning On Moral Grounds, María Cristina Redondo (Università degli Studi di Genova, Italy)

5. Pragmatic Encroachment, the Unity Thesis and the Law, Diego Dei Vecchi (Universitat de Girona, Spain)

   Part 3: Legal Reasoning and the Perspective of the Participants

6. Acceptance, Detached Legal Statements, and Practical Reason, Pablo A Rapetti (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)
7. We-Intentions and the Legal Point of View, Sebastián Figueroa Rubio (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain)

8. The Unity of Practical Reason and the Thesis of the Social Sources of Law, Natalia Scavuzzo (Universitat de Girona, Spain)

   Part 4: Legal Reasoning and the Institutional Nature of Law

9. No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz's and Waldron's Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field, Paula Gaido (Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina)
10. Inferential Authority in Practical Reasoning, Damiano Canale (Università Bocconi, Italy)
11. On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason, Julieta A Rabanos (Univerzitet u Beogradu, Serbia)