"The most complete, enjoyable, and worthwhile textbook treating both traditional and modern microeconomic theory."

Autorentext

David M. Kreps

Klappentext

David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.

Inhalt

prefacechapter one: An overview

• 1.1. The basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium

• 1.2. The purpose of microeconomic theory

• 1.3. Scope, detail, emphasis, and complexity

• 1.4. A précis of the plotpart I: Individual and social choicechapter two: The theory of consumer choice and demand

• Prologue to part I

• 2.1. Preferences and choices

• 2.2. Marshallian demand without derivatives

• 2.3. Marshallian demand with derivatives

• 2.4. Aggregate demand

• 2.5. Bibliographic notes

• 2.6. Problemschapter three: Choice under uncertainty

• 3.1. Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility

• 3.2. On utility for money

• 3.3. Applications to market demand

• 3.4. States of nature and subjective probability

• 3.5. Problems with these models

• 3.6. Normative applications of the theory

• 3.7. Bibliographic notes

• 3.8. Problemschapter four: Dynamic choice

• 4.1. Optimal dynamic strategies

• 4.2. Menus and meals

• 4.3. Bibliographic notes and discussion

• 4.4. Problemschapter five: Social choice and efficiency

• 5.1. The problem

• 5.2. Pareto efficiency and optimality: Definitions

• 5.3. Benevolent social dictators and social welfare functionals

• 5.4. Characterizing efficient social outcomes

• 5.5. Social choice rules and Arrow’s possibility theorem

• 5.6. Bibliographic notes

• 5.7. Problemspart II: The price mechanismchapter six: Pure exchange and general equilibrium

• Prologue to part II

• 6.1. Pure exchange and price equilibrium

• 6.2. Why (not) believe in Walrasian equilibrium?

• 6.3. The efficiency of a general equilibrium

• 6.4. Existence and the number of equilibria

• 6.5. Time, uncertainty, and general equilibrium

• 6.6. Bibliographic notes

• 6.7. Problemschapter seven: The neoclassical firm

• 7.1. Models of the firm’s technological capabilities

• 7.2. The profit function

• 7.3. Conditional factor demands and cost functions

• 7.4. From profit or cost functions to technology sets

• 7.5. Cost functions and -runs

• 7.6. Bibliographic notes

• 7.7. Problemschapter eight: The competitive firm and perfect competition

• 8.1. A perfectly competitive market

• 8.2. Perfect competition and -runs

• 8.3. What’s wrong with partial equilibrium analysis?

• 8.4. General equilibrium with firms

• 8.5. Bibliographic notes

• 8.6. Problemschapter nine: Monopoly

• 9.1. The standard theory

• 9.2. Maintaining monopoly

• 9.3. Multigood monopoly

• 9.4. Nonlinear pricing

• 9.5. Monopoly power?

• 9.6. Bibliographic notes

• 9.7. Problemschapter ten: Imperfect competition

• 10.1. The classic models of duopoly

• 10.2. Bibliographic notes and discussion

• 10.3. Problemspart III: Noncooperative game theorychapter eleven: Modeling competitive situations

• Prologue to part III

• 11.1. Games in extensive form: An example

• 11.2. Games in extensive form: Formalities

• 11.3. Games in normal or stategic form

• 11.4. Mixed strategies and Kuhn’s theorem

• 11.5. Bibliographic notes

• 11.6. Problemschapter twelve: Solution concepts for noncooperative games12.1. Opening remarks12.2. Dominance and iterated dominance for normal form games12.3. Backwards induction in games of complete and perfect information12.4. Nash equilibrium12.5. Equilibria in mixed strategies12.6. Why might there be an obvious way to play a given game?12.7. Refinements of Nash equilibrium

• 12.7.1. Weak dominance

• 12.7.2. Subgame perfection (and iterated weak dominance)

• 12.7.3. Sequential equilibrium

• 12.7.4. Restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs

• 12.7.5. Trembling-hand perfection

• 12.7.6. Proper equilibria and stable sets of equilibria12.8. Reprise: Classic duopoly12.9. Bibliographic notes12.10. Problemschapter thirteen: Incomplete information and irrationality

• 13.1. Games of incomplete information

• 13.2. An application: Entry deterrence

• 13.3. Modeling irrationality

• 13.4. More on refinements: Complete theories

• 13.5. Bibliographic notes

• 13.6. Problemschapter fourteen: Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation

• 14.1. The prisoners’ dilemma

• 14.2. Repeating games can yield cooperation: The folk theorem

• 14.3. Noisy observables

• 14.4. Implicit collusion in oligopoly

• 14.5. Reputation

• 14.6. Reputation redux: Incomplete information

• 14.7. Bibliographic notes

• 14.8. Problemschapter fifteen: Bilateral bargaining

• 15.1. Simultaneous offers and indeterminancy

• 15.2. Focal equilibria

• 15.3. Rubinstein’s model

• 15.4. The experimental evidence about alternating offers

• 15.5. Models with incomplete information

• 15.6. Bibliographic notes

• 15.7. Problemspart IV: Topics in information economicschapter sixteen: Moral hazard and incentives

• Prologue to part IV

• 16.1. Introduction

• 16.2. Effort incentives: A simple example

• 16.3. Finitely many actions and outcomes

• 16.4. Continuous actions: The first-order approach

• 16.5. Bibliographic notes and variations

• 16.6. Problemschapter seventeen: Adverse selection and market signaling

• 17.1. Akerlof’s model of lemons

• 17.2. Signaling quality

• 17.3. Signaling and game theory

• 17.4. Bibliographic notes and discussion

• 17.5. Problemschapter eighteen: The revelation principle and mechanism design

• 18.1. Optimal contracts designed for a single party

• 18.2. Optimal contracts for interacting parties

• 18.3. The pivot mechanism

• 18.4. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

• 18.5. Bibliographic notes

• 18.6. Problemspart V: Firms and transactionschapter nineteen: Theories of the firm

• 19.1. The firm as a profit-maximizing entity

• 19.2. The firm as a maximizing entity

• 19.3. The firm as a behavioral entity

• 19.4. Firms in the category of markets

• 19.5. Bibliographic notes

• 19.6. Problemschapter twenty: Transaction cost economics and the firm

• 20.1. Transaction cost economics and firms

• 20.2. Mathematical models of transaction cost economics

• 20.3. Bibliographic notespostscriptappendix one: Constrained optimization

• A1.1. A recipe for solving problems

• A1.2. The recipe at work: An example

• A1.3. Intuition

• A1.4. Bibliographic notes

• A1.5. Problemsappendix two: Dynamic programming

• A2.1. An example with a finite horizon

• A2.2. Finite horizon dynamic programming

• A2.3. A…