This work analyses the vulnerability of America's land-based missile force to a pre-emptive Soviet strike as an issue in US strategic and political debate. It examines why the issue rose to prominence in the way it did in the 1970s and then fell away as a concern in the 1980s without being solved in the way it had been presented. It details the way in which the issue was exploited for political and strategic purposes which were often at odds with a concern for this vulnerability.

Inhalt
Foreword - Introduction - PART 1: A THREAT ESTABLISHED - ICBM Vulnerability: The Development of an Issue - Salt I and Minuteman Vulnerability: An Issue Established - Strategic Innovation and ICBM Vulnerability: Evaluating the Threat to Minuteman - Vladivostok, Nitze and the Vulnerability Scenario - PART 2: ICBM VULNERABILITY IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION - President Carter, His Critics and the Politicization of the Issue - Carter, the MX and the Window of Vulnerability: The Political Context - PART 3: ICBM VULNERABILITY IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION - The Window of Vulnerability, Strategic Modernisation and the Townes Committee - Reactions to the Townes Committee Report - The President's Commission on Strategic Forces - Reactions to the Commission's Recommendations - Conclusions - Appendix A - Appendix B - Index