Based on newly declassified documents, this book offers a provocative new analysis of President Jimmy Carter's political role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. It analyzes the reflexive relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, especially the roles played by the media, public opinion and pro-Israel lobby groups.

The Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia, is a treasure trove of material. When it comes to understanding how the Carter administration treated domestic politics in dealing with the Middle East, and in turn, how the US political scene reacted to Carter's Middle East policy, Strieff's book is an extremely valuable contribution to the growing field of Carter literature. (Jørgen Jensehaugen, Journal of Peace Research, February 18, 2016)

Autorentext

Daniel P. Strieff has taught at the University of California, Berkeley, USA, and the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, where he earned his PhD in International History.

Inhalt
Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Introduction: President And Peacemaker

1. The Limits Of Candor (January-May 1977)
2. The ' 'The Need For A Political Plan ' ' (May-July 1977)
3. Firestorm Over U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué (August-October, 1977)
4. ' 'Cronkite Diplomacy, ' ' Sadat ' 's Jerusalem Initiative And U.S. Policy (November 1977-February 1978)
5. Capitol Hill Fight Over ' 'Package ' ' Airplane Deal (February-May 1978)
6. ' 'Getting Control ' ' At Camp David (June 1978-September 1978)
7. Desperate Diplomacy And The Egypt-Israel Treaty (October 1978-March 1979)
8. Lines Blur As Election Approaches (April 1979-November 1980)
   Conclusion: Reconciling The Irreconcilable?
   Bibliography