Dynamic Models of Oligopoly

Informationen zum Autor D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole Klappentext Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly. Zusammenfassung Uses the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide an approach to oligopoly. Inhaltsverzeichnis Part 1 ?his survey is the outgrowth of lectures we gave at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences (IMSSS), Stanford University, in the summer of 1983. Our research was supported by National Science Foundation grants SES 81?769 and SES 82?373 at the IMSSS, and by SES 82?925 at the University of California, Berkeley. The authors would like to thank John Geanakoplos, David Kreps, Eric Maskin, John Roberts, Jose Scheinkman and Robert Wilson for helpful conversations, and Mordecai Kurz for encouraging us to undertake this project., Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole; Chapter 1 Introduction; Chapter 2 Competition in Tangible Variables; Chapter 3 Preemption; Chapter 4 Short-Run Commitment, Fixed Costs, and Natural Monopolies; Chapter 5 Price Wars and Tacit Collusion; Chapter 6 Investing in Disinformation;

Autorentext

D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole

Klappentext

Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly.

Zusammenfassung

In October 2014, Jean Tirole capped a long career by scooping the Nobel Prize for Economic Science. Tirole's long career saw him make major contributions to industrial organization, game theory and financial theory and Dynamic Models of Oligopoly, co-authored with this long term collaborator Drew Fudenberg, was where it all began back in 1986. Originally published by Harwood Academic Publishers, the book paints a picture of an economy as an ever evolving and far from static system and stands as a document to the more nuanced and realistic approach to economic modelling which Tirole did so much to foster.

Inhalt
Part 1 This survey is the outgrowth of lectures we gave at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences (IMSSS), Stanford University, in the summer of 1983. Our research was supported by National Science Foundation grants SES 8104769 and SES 8201373 at the IMSSS, and by SES 8207925 at the University of California, Berkeley. The authors would like to thank John Geanakoplos, David Kreps, Eric Maskin, John Roberts, Jose Scheinkman and Robert Wilson for helpful conversations, and Mordecai Kurz for encouraging us to undertake this project., Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole; Chapter 1 Introduction; Chapter 2 Competition in Tangible Variables; Chapter 3 Preemption; Chapter 4 Short-Run Commitment, Fixed Costs, and Natural Monopolies; Chapter 5 Price Wars and Tacit Collusion; Chapter 6 Investing in Disinformation;