The use of environmental resources involves strategic behavior to provoke or settle conflicts. This book contains ten papers: six investigate conceptual issues of international environmental conflicts and cooperation while four address conflicts in monitoring and enforcing environmental controls. Advanced game-theoretic concepts are used.

Inhalt
Editor's Introduction.- Editor's Introduction.- 1: International Dimensions.- 1 International Environmental Agreements as Games.- 2 Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 Emissions.- 3 Critical Loads and International Environmental Cooperation.- 4 Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitment.- 5 The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Trade.- 6 Economic Models of Optimal Energy Use under Global Environmental Constraints.- 2: Monitoring and Enforcement.- 7 Monitoring and Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws in Europe and the United States.- 8 The Economics of Negotiations on Water Quality An Application of Principal Agent Theory.- 9 Monitoring the Emission of Pollutants by Means of the Inspector Leadership Method.- 10 Illegal Pollution and Monitoring of Unknown Quality A Signaling Game Approach .