A critical study of incentives commonly used to induce non-state armed groups to engage in peace negotiations. Offers a closer analysis of these incentives, which offer such groups a place or a stake in governance, suggesting that not only are they frequently ineffective, but that they can have unintended and dangerous side effects.

'A thoughtful and well-designed study of a vitally important issue in building a peace after civil war. Should armed groups be included in the postwar settlement and share power? Chandra Sriram explores this challenging question with in-depth case studies of the conflicts in Sri Lanka, Sudan and Colombia. Every specialist and every practitioner would benefit from reading her cautionary words.' - Michael W. Doyle, Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science, Columbia University, and co-author of Making War and Building Peace

Autorentext

CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM is Professor of Human Rights at the University of East London, UK. She has previously taught at the University of St. Andrews and the University of Maryland, and worked at the International Peace Academy. She is author of various books and journal articles on international relations, international law, human rights and conflict prevention and peacebuilding. She founded the Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, an interdisciplinary research centre, in 2006.

Inhalt
Introduction: The Promise and Limits of Governance Incentives Conflict Resolution: Power-Sharing and Other Inclusion Strategies Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution in Practice Sri Lanka: The Repeated Failure of Inclusion Incentives Sudan: The Dangerous Collateral Effects of Inclusion Incentives Colombia: The Limited Appeal of Inclusion Incentives Conclusion: The Need for More Nuanced Governance Incentives