This book analyzes the ways in which US policy toward Iraq was dictated by America's broader Cold War strategy between 1958 and 1975. While most historians have focused on hot Cold War conflicts such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, few have recognized Iraq's significance as a Cold War battleground. This book argues that US decisions and actions were designed to deny the Soviet Union influence over Iraq and to create a strategic base in the oil-rich Gulf region. Using newly available primary sources and interviews, this book reveals new details on America's decision-making toward and actions against Iraq during the height of the Cold War and shows where Iraq fits into the broader historiography of the Cold War in the Middle East. Further, it raises important questions about widely held misconceptions of US-Iraqi relations, such as the CIA's alleged involvement in the 1963 Ba'thist coup and the theory that the US sold out the Kurds in 1975.

Autorentext
Bryan R. Gibson holds a PhD in International History from the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. He is the author of C overt Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 and co-editor of The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives.

Inhalt
List of Maps Acknowledgements Introduction Acronyms and Abbreviations 1. Eisenhower and the Qasim Regime, July 1958 January 1961 2. Kennedy and the Qasim Regime, January 1961 February 1963 3. Kennedy and the Ba'thist Regime, February November 1963 4. Johnson and the Arab Nationalists, November 1963 January 1969 5. Nixon and the Second Ba'thist Regime, January 1969 July 1972 6. Nixon and the Kurdish Operation, August 1972 October 1973 7. Kissinger and the Kurdish War, October 1973 March 1975