These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.

Klappentext

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the First International ICST Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, AMMA 2009, held in Boston, MA, USA, in May 2009.

The 16 revised papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 38 submissions. The contents range from fundamental theory on auctions and markets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets. This includes an understanding of the economic and gametheoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications.

This volume aims at economists, computer scientists, theorists and empiricists as well as academics and practitioners.

Inhalt
Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions.- Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google.- A Copula Function Approach to Infer Correlation in Prediction Markets.- Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion.- A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile.- Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions.- Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Markets.- Market Design for a P2P Backup System.- School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism.- Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market.- A Market-Based Approach to Multi-factory Scheduling.- Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization.- Revenue Submodularity.- Fair Package Assignment.- Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale.- Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What to Do about It.